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NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE TEETH OF HUMAN 
FRAILTY: LESSONS FROM FINANCIAL REGULATION 
CRISTIE FORD* 
 New governance scholarship has made important theoretical and 
practical contributions to a broad range of regulatory arenas, including 
securities and financial markets regulation. In the wake of the global financial 
crisis, questions about the scope of possibilities for this scholarship are more 
pressing than ever. Is new governance a full-blown alternative to existing 
legal structures, or is it a useful complement? Are there essential 
preconditions to making it work, or can a new governance strategy improve 
any decision making structure? If there are essential preconditions, what are 
they? Is new governance ―modular‖—that is, does it still confer benefits 
when applied partially or imperfectly—or does it fail to achieve good 
regulatory results unless all the elements are in place? This Article starts from 
the conviction that new governance is a promising response to the fluidity 
and complexity of contemporary regulatory environments. It then draws on 
three essentially unhappy narratives from recent financial markets regulation 
(around securities law enforcement, capital adequacy, and the impact of 
securitization) in an attempt to identify lessons for new governance 
scholarship at the level of practical implementation. These are not narratives 
about the failure of new governance structures. However, central to each 
narrative are components, or incomplete versions of components, that are 
also central to new governance structures. The Article considers the 
significance of incrementalism, regulatory capacity, and destabilization and 
complexity for regulatory design. It closes with some preliminary 
recommendations for making new governance structures effective, even as 
implemented by flawed human actors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
New governance scholarship has made important contributions in a 
broad range of regulatory arenas, ranging from environmental regulation 
to workplace discrimination, international employment standards, and 
beyond. 
As the field has developed, some scholars have also turned their 
minds to the scope of possibilities for new governance. Is it a full-blown 
alternative to existing legal structures, or is it a useful complement? Are 
there essential preconditions to making it work, or can a new governance 
strategy improve any decision making structure? If there are essential 
preconditions, what are they? When it works, why does it work? Is new 
governance ―modular‖1—that is, does it still confer benefits when 
applied partially or imperfectly—or does it fail to achieve good 
regulatory results unless all the elements are in place? 
For students of financial market regulation, the global financial 
crisis of 2007–09 (GFC)2 has been a sobering illustration of human greed 
and short-sightedness, and regulatory failure. This Article is a 
preliminary attempt to identify lessons from recent financial markets 
regulation and their bearing on new governance scholarship. Part I sets 
out the continuing importance of new governance scholarship for 
regulation. Part II presents three narratives, from different aspects of 
financial regulation. In this Part, the Article proceeds from the most 
discrete example to the most far-reaching and challenging, but each one 
bears on the nature of the relationship between new governance 
 
 1. With apologies to Jody Freeman and Daniel Farber, this variety of 
modularity is not the same as their positive account of modular environmental regulation 
in which regulatory components can be assembled and reassembled in different 
arrangements depending on circumstance. See generally Jody Freeman & Daniel A. 
Farber, Modular Environmental Regulation, 54 DUKE L.J. 795 (2005). 
 2. The GFC is broadly global in scope. Focusing only on the United States, it 
can be dated from the first effects of the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States in 
2006–07, through the collapse of global credit markets in fall 2008, which saw the failure 
of major investment banks in the United States and brought about an industry bailout and 
economic stimulus package of unprecedented size, and into the present day. For a 
timeline of the core of the crisis, from September 2008 to September 2009, see A Year of 
Financial Turmoil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2009, http://www.nytimes. 
com/interactive/2009/09/11/business/economy/20090911_FINANCIALCRISIS_TIMELI
NE.html?ref=businessspecial4. 
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regulatory design and the much less satisfactory regulation-as-
implemented. These are not narratives about the failure of new 
governance structures. Financial regulation was not new governance 
regulation. Moreover, the main regulatory failures implicated in the GFC 
were the products of gaps in regulation, extraordinarily inadequate 
execution, and a regulatory mindset excessively well-disposed toward 
self-regulation. That said, central to each narrative are components (or 
incomplete versions of components) that are also central to new 
governance structures. 
More precisely, these are stories about how regulatory oversight 
mechanisms that were designed to be both robust and flexible proved in 
practice to lose their robustness and to have their flexibility invoked 
primarily in the interests of powerful industry actors. For example, the 
first narrative describes how certain corporate compliance monitorships 
have been only anemically implemented, highlighting the importance of 
cognitive distance, capacity, and impartiality on the part of the real-life 
human decision-makers central to those structures. The second narrative 
argues that principles-based regulation around capital adequacy (such as 
provided for under the Consolidated Supervised Entities program at the 
SEC, and the Basel II regime on which it was based), when built on 
inadequately scrutinized internal firm risk assessment models, enabled a 
behavioral cascade and permitted flawed methodologies to increase 
systemic risk. The third narrative focuses on complexity in structured 
products. It tries to illuminate some of the ways in which the use of 
derivatives and securitization technology have amplified power, allowed 
power to be exercised covertly within corporate structures, and permitted 
financial institutions to circumvent or neutralize regulatory oversight. 
Part III of this Article sets out to identify the lessons that emerge for 
new governance scholarship at the level of practical implementation. 
This Article explains these implementation failures substantially as a 
product of power imbalances, bounded rationality, and the human 
tendency to ―satisfice.‖3 Different scholars may reach different 
conclusions as to how often problems like these will actually sabotage 
new governance regulatory design. But if they are unavoidable 
background conditions, and influential enough to affect practical 
outcomes in a significant number of cases, then—in keeping with a 
method that reflects learning back into regulatory design—new 
governance scholars should be turning their attention to designing 
compensatory structures to address these foreseeable problems. 
 
 3. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 204–05 
(1957) (explaining that ―satisficing‖ means settling for an adequate, but not optimal 
solution). 
FORD - READ THROUGH.DOC 6/9/2010 12:27 PM 
104 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
The Article closes with a call for more serious attention to the 
―architecture‖ of new governance, and in particular to the need to build 
in practically effective counterweights to the predictable pitfalls that can 
undermine the potential of new governance theory. It argues that one 
should not underestimate the considerable determination and focus 
required to make new governance structures reliably robust across 
different regulatory concerns. In particular, it argues for a renewed 
appreciation of the amount of energy required to move people off their 
short-term incentives—an amount substantially greater than was put into 
the monitorship or principles-based regulatory initiatives described 
below, and that may even be greater than is politically palatable in some 
number of contexts. Second, the Article points out that reason-giving and 
problem-solving techniques collapse when key players‘ interests are 
aligned, as they tend to be during a market bubble, or in contexts already 
characterized by a readiness to accept merely ―cosmetic compliance.‖4 
This points to the need to build in diversity and internal contestation in a 
much more serious way than generally has been done. Third, the Article 
suggests that Knightian uncertainty
5
 is not necessarily, or not only, a new 
governance-enhancing background condition. It can present profound 
problems to which new governance may not be a necessary and 
sufficient response—or even, at least over the short term, the wisest 
response. 
I. CRUCIAL COMPONENTS OF NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE POST-GFC 
ENVIRONMENT 
The term ―new governance‖ is something of a big tent that captures 
several discrete but related approaches.
6
 Within new governance, we 
might identify as a tighter subset the ―experimentalist‖ approach 
principally generated by Charles Sabel and his colleagues, including 
Michael Dorf and Bill Simon.
7
 Susan Sturm‘s important work on 
 
 4. Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487 (2003). 
 5. See generally FRANK KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921). 
 6. See, e.g., LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND US (Gráinne de 
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation 
and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 
(2004). 
 7. See generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); James S. Liebman & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of 
School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2004); 
Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004). 
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institutional change and public-law remedies is another new governance 
approach.
8
 New governance also likely incorporates, or at least bears a 
strong relationship to, versions of reflexive law,
9
 responsive regulation or 
enforced self-regulation,
10
 co-regulation,
11
 and management-based 
regulation.
12
 
For purposes of this Article, the essential components of a new 
governance approach are regulation that is informed and underpinned by 
a bottom-up, decentered, horizontal experimental process by private 
actors—which, on our facts, depending on context, could include 
registrants like investment banks and broker-dealers, professional 
―gatekeepers‖13 such as accountants and lawyers, and public companies. 
My own focus is on new governance in the context of regulation, that is, 
on designs that assume a systemic ordering role for a public bureaucratic 
structure, rather than relying primarily on private interparty arrangements 
or courts. New governance regulation, unlike command-and-control 
regulation, is regulation based on an iterative process between private-
party experience and a regulator that serves variously as clearinghouse, 
catalyst, monitor, prod, and coordinator. 
The new governance regulator prioritizes mechanisms that share 
information from localized experiments and that push localities to 
improve by comparison to the experience of others, rather than trying to 
regulate via detailed, process-based, top-down regulatory requirements. 
The process is pragmatic, information- and experience-based, directed 
toward ongoing problem-solving, and built around highly participatory 
and carefully structured dialogue. As a matter of institutional design, it 
relies on information-based and information-forcing techniques: 
 
 8. Sturm‘s work informs and is informed by the experimentalist approach, but 
see Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural 
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 555 n.353 (2001). 
 9. See Eric Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 
(1995); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law, 17 LAW & 
SOC‘Y REV. 239 (1983). But see Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal 
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 471 (2004). 
 10. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION (1992); 
John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime 
Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1981). 
 11. See Linda Senden, Soft Law, Self-Regulation and Co-Regulation in 
European Law: Where Do They Meet?, 9.1 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L. 1 (2005), available 
at http://www.ejcl.org/91/abs91-3.html. 
 12. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: 
Prescribing Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC‘Y REV. 691 
(2003). 
 13. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE (2006). 
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specifically, reason-giving, transparent processes, benchmarking and 
outcome analysis, and shared information. It is incrementalist in that it 
uses discrete, situational learning to cause regulation to evolve in 
empirically justified ways. It is ambitious in that it folds those discrete 
experiences, operating in parallel, into a flexible, ―best practices‖-driven 
process
14
 that has the potential to fundamentally reshape both means and 
ends. 
Above all, for purposes of this Article, three related convictions that 
underlie new governance regulatory strategies are indispensable to 
modern regulation, because they are designed to handle the complexity, 
speed, and interconnection that characterize both contemporary society 
and contemporary capital markets. The first is the emphasis on ―learning 
by doing.‖ Empirical experience, the ―doing,‖ is the foundation of new 
governance regulation. In itself that is a step that is likely to lead to 
greater pragmatic effectiveness than an ideologically driven 
methodology.
15
 The doing is then the driver for a structured learning 
process that pulls that experience into a self-reflexive process, rather than 
letting it dissipate across time and multiple actors. 
The second component is revisability, or the explicit recognition of 
contingency. Flexibility is a key characteristic of new governance 
methods. Learning by doing is the method, but it needs to be 
accompanied by actual mechanisms that make it possible for regulation 
to move. Examples might include principles-based regulation, supported 
by a regulator-based notice-and-comment rulemaking method that can 
permit speedy decisions by informed actors; or broad-based 
destabilization rights available under particular conditions.
16
 
The third, linked component is a degree of humility about 
knowability. At an initial level, new governance recognizes that 
regulators cannot know as much about the practical operations of the 
industries they oversee as those within those industries themselves. This 
is what drives the bottom-up process in the first place. At a deeper level, 
along with civic republicans, new governance scholars like Michael Dorf 
and Charles Sabel recognize the socially constructed, profoundly 
contingent, and path dependent nature of legal artifacts generally, such as 
 
 14. Whether regulators ought to rely on ―best practices‖ or ―good practices‖ is a 
matter of debate among securities regulators. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, 
Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 43 n.144 
(2008) [hereinafter Ford, New Governance, Compliance ]. 
 15. On Deweyan pragmatism and experimentalism, see, e.g., Brandon L. 
Garrett & James S. Liebman, Experimentalist Equal Protection, 22 YALE L. & POL‘Y 
REV. 261 (2004). 
 16. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 7. 
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rights.
17
 Still more profoundly, a relationship exists between new 
governance and epistemological uncertainty. It is a relationship marked 
by paradox,
18
 but it is not without promise. New governance authors 
have argued that conditions of extreme uncertainty, in which participants 
cannot identify either the means they want to use or the ends they are 
trying to achieve, are environments where new governance is more likely 
to emerge, and to be useful in breaking through impasses. Radical 
uncertainty resulting from extreme complexity has been a central feature 
of capital markets regulation, and was closely implicated in the GFC. 
The problem is a wicked one, without easy solutions. Nevertheless, new 
governance revisability based on closely monitored practical experience 
and broad stakeholder participation may be one of the few potentially 
promising ways that we might try to deal with it. 
With these tools in hand we can proceed to the narratives, which 
ultimately both reinforce and complicate the insights that new 
governance offers. Recent events in financial markets regulation have 
profoundly shaken our collective confidence in existing regulatory 
approaches. They have also undermined our collective faith in our own 
capacity to understand events as they transpire, to anticipate future 
developments, and to design systems that can be robust in complex 
environments. All of this should recommend more incremental, 
pragmatic, learning-by-doing regulatory design strategies. At the same 
time, these same narratives describe incremental, apparently pragmatic 
regulatory moves that, though believed by many to be sensible at the 
time, collectively operated to the great detriment of many. They suggest 
that incrementalism as it operated here—within built regulatory 
environments that share important features with new governance 
regulatory environments—cannot on its own be relied upon to advance 
collective welfare—in the sense of increasing transparency, reducing 
systemic risk, protecting investors and members of the public, supporting 
real economy productivity, and maintaining an adequate level of social 
stability and interpersonal accountability. The challenge, then, is to 
imagine an alternative within which regulatory design is not always a 
drag on human capacity and imagination, in the way that old style non-
reflexive command-and-control regulation can be, and yet that puts 
sufficient brakes on risk-blind hubris, socially detrimental self-
aggrandizement, and predictable human flaws in decision-making and 
information processing. 
 
 17. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7, at 446–52 (arguing that experimentalist 
rights are ―the only kind of rights that we actually have‖). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.C (―Clever People: Destabilization, Complexity, 
and Power in Securitization Practice‖). 
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II. THREE NARRATIVES FROM FINANCIAL AND SECURITIES REGULATION 
Each of the narratives below comes from securities and financial 
markets regulation, although from distinct contexts within that field. The 
first narrative concerns monitorships being employed in securities law 
enforcement. It identifies the ways in which new governance-style 
enforcement mechanisms can be undermined by failure to build in 
meaningful accountability. The second narrative considers principles-
based regulatory structures, particularly the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission‘s Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) 
program, which allowed parent entities of ―shadow banks‖ to use internal 
risk modeling to assess the risks associated with their business, and 
thereby to set their own capital reserve levels. Devolving this 
responsibility, which took place within a highly complex, highly 
competitive, fast-moving and yet non-transparent and poorly overseen 
environment, turned out to be disastrous. Again, the story is primarily 
about regulatory failure to build accountability and enforceability into a 
self-regulatory model. The third narrative looks at the influence of 
securitization itself, in particular with regard to how it affects regulators‘ 
capacity to regulate the financial services industry. Derivatives and 
structured finance products have been core tools for speculation and 
hedging for many years now. Their recent massive proliferation does, 
however, have implications for corporate law and securities regulation in 
terms of transparency and accountability. 
The leitmotif that runs through all three accounts concerns the ways 
in which background conditions that are either subtle or taken for 
granted—including lack of diversity, power imbalances, unequal access 
to information, and failures of transparency and accountability—have the 
potential to make reasonably designed regulatory initiatives ineffective, 
or worse. These are stories in which well-resourced actors were able to 
control loosely structured, fluid environments in their own interest, with 
minimal pushback from public-interested voices. In other words, they are 
situations in which our flawed humanity (tribal, short-sighted, self-
interested but often irrational, and prone to satisficing) infiltrated 
regulatory models, reintroduced power relationships in indistinct but 
convincing ways, and arguably determined outcomes to a greater degree 
than did regulatory design. The section titles below offer shorthand 
labels for the relevant characteristics of the individuals involved, with the 
intention of keeping the human element in the foreground of each 
narrative. 
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A. Reliable People: Corporate Monitorships in Theory and Practice 
Securities law enforcement has recently been making use of a 
particular set of innovations: the non-prosecution or deferred prosecution 
agreement in the criminal realm, and its civil regulatory equivalent, the 
reform undertaking. These are settlement agreements under which, in 
exchange for leniency or a deferral or prosecution for alleged violations 
of the securities laws, a corporation or firm agrees to end its wrongful 
practices, develop and implement an improved compliance program, 
and—most importantly for purposes of this Article—hire an independent 
monitor to oversee those undertakings and make reform 
recommendations.
19
 Monitorships have been imposed on some very well-
known firms and corporations, including America Online, KPMG, 
Boeing, Monsanto, and AIG (this last for reasons unrelated to credit 
default swaps or executive bonuses).
20
 They are not unlike consent 
decrees in civil-rights-based structural reform litigation.
21
 Being systemic 
remedies, they seem well suited to responding to systemic problems. 
They could be used to push corporations to implement effective 
compliance and ethics programs and improve the ethics aspects of their 
organizational cultures—meaning, the informal control system within the 
organization. What is less clear is whether, as implemented, they stand a 
decent chance of doing so. 
At a theoretical level, monitorships can be understood as a nascent 
new governance form developing within the securities law enforcement 
milieu.
22
 Seen in these terms, the ideal monitorship structure requires a 
 
 19. See generally Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 853, 855–56 (2007); Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a 
Prosecution Deferred? Judicial Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863 (2005); Jennifer O‘Hare, The Use of the 
Corporate Monitor in SEC Enforcement Actions, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 89 
(2006); Leonard Orland, The Transformation of Corporate Criminal Law, 1 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 45 (2006). 
 20. Cristie Ford & David Hess, Can Corporate Monitorships Improve 
Corporate Compliance?, 34 J. CORP. L. 679, 680 (2009). On AIG, see Peter Lattman, The 
US’s Fly on the Wall at AIG, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2009, at C1 (noting that a monitor 
was in place at AIG before and during the financial crisis, but was not charged with 
investigating matters directly related to the financial crisis, such as the use of credit 
default swaps). 
 21. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 19, at 869–74. 
 22. See generally Cristie L. Ford, Toward a New Model for Securities Law 
Enforcement, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 757 (2005) [hereinafter Ford, Toward a New Model ] 
(discussing the civil ―reform undertaking‖ process at the United States Securities and 
Exchange Commission). Miriam Baer has since challenged this view at a descriptive 
level, arguing that whatever else they may be, reform undertakings and deferred 
prosecution agreements are not and can never be an example of new governance. See 
generally Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949 (2009). 
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broadly participatory, dialogic, and transparent problem-solving process 
capable of learning from its own mistakes. The idea here is that 
monitorships can create a space for meaningful dialogue because, 
although they are embedded within the enforcement context, they are 
sufficiently set apart by virtue of being post-settlement and managed by 
an independent third party monitor. Relative to one-off sanctions such as 
fines, such a forward-looking and participatory method could be more 
effective in catalyzing cultural reform.
23
 It uses the organization‘s own 
language and norms to foster endogenous learning. This increases the 
likelihood of buy-in, which is especially essential when dealing with 
ethical cultural problems.
24
 Moreover, such a monitorship can potentially 
identify more useful recommendations, because it relies on more sources 
of information, consulted in a less high-pressure environment.
25
 This can 
make scapegoating and cosmetic compliance
26
 harder to get away with. 
Clearly, catalyzing a new governance deliberative process by way of 
a monitorship requires careful design choices. For one thing, the monitor 
would have to possess an impressive range of attributes. It (or he or she) 
would have to have credibility with both regulator and corporation, while 
still maintaining structural and psychological independence from the 
corporation in particular—even while working closely with its 
management and employees. It would need to possess considerable 
strategic planning, problem solving, facilitating, and information 
management capabilities. It should be able to generate useful and, 
ideally, generalizable data. The monitor would also require substantive 
experience including knowledge about best practices in compliance and 
corporate governance, as well as a grasp of legal concepts such as 
fairness and due process sufficient to allow it to identify and respond to 
scapegoating and other, often subtle, justice-related challenges.
27
 The 
framing enforcement environment around the monitorship, and in 
particular the background threat of renewed enforcement action in the 
event of shirking or failure, would also be crucial to forcing change 
within recalcitrant organizations. Additionally, regulators would need the 
ability to centrally aggregate and work with data coming from discrete 
monitorships—in new governance terms, they would require a 
―clearinghouse‖ function—in order to make risk assessment, 
comparative analysis, and outcome evaluation possible.
28
 
 
 23. Ford, Toward a New Model, supra note 22, at 802–10. 
 24. Id. at 808. 
 25. Id. at 802. 
 26. Krawiec, supra note 4. 
 27. Ford, Toward a New Model, supra note 22, at 810–14. 
 28. Id. at 814–17. 
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In 2008, Professor David Hess and I conducted an empirical study 
to investigate how corporate monitorships were functioning in practice.
29
 
We found, perhaps not surprisingly, that actually existing monitorships 
tend to fall short of the idealized new governance monitorship in one or 
more ways. In our project, we separated the monitorship process into five 
stages: the decision to settle and establish a monitorship, setting the 
scope of the monitorship, selecting the monitor, conducting the 
monitorship, and post-monitorship learning.
30
 What we found was that 
the potential for a breakdown in effective implementation exists at each 
stage of the monitorship. Moreover, problems at early stages put the 
monitorship on a downward trajectory, in terms of ambition, that make 
its prospects for achieving meaningful reform increasingly remote with 
every subsequent stage.
31
 Without saying that successful monitorships 
have never occurred, our analysis suggests that positive results have 
more to do with self-motivated individual efforts of monitors and 
corporations, than with a model that reliably produces good process and 
meaningful reform.
32
 
For example, one of the first decisions a regulator faces is how to 
proceed against the corporation and individuals in it: whether to indict or 
charge the corporation, whether to agree to a settlement (with or without 
a monitor), or alternatively whether to prosecute individuals only.
33
 
Where corporations have the sense that this choice is primarily motivated 
by external considerations, such as perceived need to be seen to be taking 
action against a corporation, the legitimacy of the process is undermined 
from the start.
34
 Developing the scope of the monitorship can also be 
problematic. In many cases, monitorship agreements seem to develop 
mimetically
35
 rather than in response to careful attention to a unique 
context. The starting point often seems to be some other, generic 
monitorship agreement, whose terms are then modified based in large 
part on the negotiating position of the corporation.
36
 Sometimes, we had 
 
 29. Our study and its findings are described in Ford & Hess, supra note 20. The 
discussion of monitorships contained here draws on that work. 
 30. Id. at 695–96. 
 31. Id. at 730. 
 32. Id. at 728. 
 33. Id. at 697. 
 34. See id. at 728–29. 
 35. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: 
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. 
SOC. REV. 147, 151–52 (1983) (describing mimetic isomorphism as a process through 
which organizations copy each other to draw on the legitimacy established by the prior 
example, and not due to its fitness to the new environment). 
 36. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 816–20 (2008) (describing the settlement 
negotiating process). Barnard shares many of our concerns regarding the effectiveness of 
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the impression that only cursory attention had been paid, at this stage, to 
ensuring that the resulting monitorship was appropriately tailored to the 
particular mix of potential systemic, process-based, and cultural 
problems at a particular corporation. 
Early stage flaws in scope definition would not be terribly 
worrisome if monitorship agreements could be renegotiated on a rolling 
basis, but the high costs of monitorships, the fear of ―scope creep,‖ and 
monitorships‘ entrenchment in formal legal settlement documents makes 
this very unlikely. More often, the response is to build some vagueness 
into the exact terms of the monitorship—which is something different 
from building in carefully designed flexibility provisions. When 
vagueness is introduced, the course of the monitorship depends less on 
the agreement itself, and more on the monitor‘s interpretation of it based 
on the monitor‘s own background and predilections. And it is at the point 
of selecting the monitor that the reformative potential of the monitorship 
seems most fundamentally to be undermined. 
Monitors may be appointed by the government, or selected based on 
varying degrees of input from the corporation. Regardless of the process 
used, with striking frequency the end result is the selection of a former 
prosecutor or other government employee, with legal training but little to 
no experience as a monitor, and no formal training in compliance or 
management. The reason for the significant use of former prosecutors 
seems to be perceived credibility.
37
 The government wants someone it 
can identify with and believes it can trust, and the corporation wants to 
ensure that its monitor has credibility with the government.
38
 The 
significant potential problem, at least according to compliance 
consultants we interviewed, is that these monitors are unlikely to have 
the experience and knowledge necessary to analyze a corporation‘s 
culture or provide advice on how to manage that culture as it relates to 
the corporation‘s compliance program.39 For example, such monitors are 
more likely to believe that the root causes of wrongdoing within the 
 
monitorships, the monitor selection process, and the capacity of lawyers in general and 
SEC (or, for us, criminal and civil) Enforcement staffers in particular to craft 
monitorships with the potential to achieve meaningful structural change. Id. at 837–38. 
Barnard also agrees that the SEC should be managing the data coming from monitorships 
more effectively, and making better use of monitors‘ final reports. Id. at 837–39. Her 
views differ from ours in other respects, including her confidence in mainstream 
corporate law mechanisms (e.g., the presence of independent directors) to discipline 
firms. Id. at 837–38. She concludes that monitorships and other ―therapeutics‖ should be 
used sparingly because their usefulness has not been demonstrated. Id. at 838. 
 37. Ford & Hess, supra note 20, at 713. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 714. 
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organization are employee ignorance of laws and corporate policies, as 
opposed to management pressure to meet performance expectations.
40
 
We also found wide variation in how monitors conduct their work.
41
 
Some monitors felt that they had no choice but to consider issues of 
corporate culture based on what the settlement agreement tasked them 
with accomplishing.
42
 Others, appointed under virtually identical 
settlement agreement language, told us that they focused on the technical 
aspects of compliance and controls, and that issues of culture could not 
be measured, had no real meaning, or were beyond their assigned 
duties.
43
 Even those monitors that claimed to be considering corporate 
culture took significantly different approaches to assessing it.
44
 Some 
interviewed employees at all levels of the corporation and sat in on 
meetings where important decisions were being made, while others 
interviewed only those at the top of the organization.
45
 The monitors we 
interviewed did not generally engage in the broad-based interviews and 
focus groups that compliance consultants and business ethics 
professionals would recommend, let alone the kind of reflexive process 
imagined by new governance scholarship. 
Finally, we identified a clear lack of architecture designed to permit 
systematic post-monitorship learning and analysis.
46
 Especially with 
regard to criminal monitorships, notwithstanding that they are rich 
sources of information and insight, we found little evidence that 
monitorships were treated with anything near the attention that pre-
settlement cases received.
47
 Little effort seemed to be made, on 
conclusion of a monitorship, to evaluate its successes and failures or to 
fold its insights into subsequent monitorships.
48
 Monitors also lack 
systematic opportunities to learn from each other. Their reports are kept 
confidential, and monitors do not share information with each other.
49
 
 
 40. GARY E. EDWARDS & ROBERT REID, CHALLENGES FACING CORPORATE 
ETHICS AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS: A RESEARCH REPORT FROM ETHOS INTERNATIONAL 
10–11 (2007), available at http://www.ethosinternational.net/files/689 
_file_PDF_EthosResearchReport2007.pdf (reporting the results of a survey of legally 
trained chief compliance officers versus those from a management background). 
 41. See Ford & Hess, supra note 20, at 715–19. 
 42. Id. at 716. 
 43. Id. at 716–17. 
 44. Id. at 717–18. 
 45. Id. at 718. 
 46. See id. at 724–26, 736–37. 
 47. Id. at 726. Civil-side regulators more commonly pass monitors‘ reports onto 
their compliance or examinations departments, which may use the reports as blueprints 
for subsequent compliance examinations and audits; prosecutors‘ offices lack the 
institutional structure to do this. Id. 
 48. Id. at 725. 
 49. Id. at 736. 
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Although settlement agreement terms are replicated, the lessons of actual 
practice are not being captured.
50
 What happens after a monitorship ends 
was poignantly summarized by one of our interviewees: 
Maybe it turned out okay, maybe it didn‘t, maybe nobody 
knows, because there‘s nobody out there evaluating these 
things. And unless a company gets caught doing something 
improper again nobody may find out whether the deferred 
prosecution agreement worked or didn‘t work.51 
Some recommendations for improved monitorships spring easily to 
mind. We would prefer the scope of monitorships to be determined in a 
more outcome-oriented, flexible, yet context-specific fashion. Monitors 
should be selected for a broader range of applicable skills. Former 
prosecutors with no monitorship experience do not stand out as the only 
good option here, despite their perceived credibility with other 
prosecutors. A more participatory and dialogue-based approach is likely 
to be more effective. The absence of mechanisms to systematize learning 
at the prosecutor or regulator level is another major failing, and affects 
those actors‘ abilities to provide effective oversight. 
But the thornier problem is that in the final analysis, contemporary 
monitorships seem disposed toward being ―closed shops.‖ The 
participants share a fundamental unity of interest around keeping the 
monitorship project and the corporation‘s rehabilitation moving ahead 
smoothly. None of the parties involved—the corporation, the government 
agency, or the monitor—have an incentive to drive the monitorship 
beyond technical fixes and good optics to something more profound, 
more uncertain, and more unpredictable (in the way that real, open-ended 
dialogue and deep analysis can be). 
Although there are exceptions, the following seems to be a common 
story: the corporation naturally wants to retain as much freedom as 
possible. It will push the government and the monitor to devise and 
implement as limited a monitorship as possible. It is helped in its case by 
the argument that unaccountable monitors should not be permitted to run 
amok and interfere with a public company‘s internal operations at 
infinitum and at shareholders‘ expense. For their part, monitors may not 
provide significant push-back against the corporation‘s limited 
interpretation of their mandate, because the monitor may naturally come 
to view the corporation as their ―client,‖ due to the close working 
relationship that develops over time, the corporation‘s role in selecting 
that monitor in certain cases, or the monitor‘s background as a corporate 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 725. 
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defense attorney in private practice (which is a common career move for 
former prosecutors). Finally, especially on the criminal side, government 
enforcers may be more focused on closing their file and moving on to the 
next the case, rather than pushing the monitor to dig deeper into the 
workings of the corporation. This is particularly so because it is 
exceedingly difficult to assess, from outside, whether a firm has an 
effective compliance program in place and whether a monitor has done 
an adequate job of rooting out problems. Prosecutors hire monitors to do 
this work precisely because they do not have the skills or bandwidth to 
do it themselves, and therefore may not even know the right questions to 
ask. The end result is the strong likelihood of low ambition monitorships 
focused on technical compliance with policy and procedure 
requirements. 
B. Self-Interested People: Principles-Based Regulation and Basel II 
Principles-based regulation has been a feature of regulatory 
innovation in securities law in recent years, most notably the United 
Kingdom, but also in Canada. Principles-based and analogous 
approaches are also used at transnational and intersystemic levels, as a 
way of moving toward policy-level or outcome-level coordination or 
convergence, even though the necessary step of reconciling separate 
legal regimes has not taken place.
52
 The June 2004 Basel II Capital 
 
 52. The familiar example here is the European Union‘s Open Method of 
Coordination, a functional and ongoing process that has attracted positive attention from 
new governance scholars. See, e.g., GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA & JONATHAN ZEITLIN, CENTRE 
FOR EUROPEAN POL‘Y STUDS., CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 31, CONSTITUTIONALISING THE 
OPEN METHOD OF COORDINATION: WHAT SHOULD THE CONVENTION PROPOSE? (2003), 
available at http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1010.pdf. The seeds of the FSA‘s 
principles-based approach were also sewn in response to the need to amalgamate regimes 
across preexisting regulatory entities. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 8, 
DESIGNING THE FSA HANDBOOK OF RULES AND GUIDANCE 4–6 (1998), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/CP08.pdf. In the interest of maintaining continuity and a 
―good standard of regulation during the transitional period,‖ the FSA was launched in 
1997, but did not have its own statutory source of regulatory power until December 2001. 
See Financial Services and Markets Act [FSMA], 2000, cl. 8, §§ 2(2)–(3) (Eng.); Howard 
Davies, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth., Speech at the FSA Launch Conference (Oct. 28, 
1997), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/ 
Communication/Speeches/1997/SP02.shtml. The FSMA replaced much of the previous 
legislation, including the Financial Services Act of 1986, the Banking Act of 1987, and 
the Insurance Companies Act of 1982 under which banks, insurance companies and other 
financial services firms had been authorized and supervised. In its early days the FSA did 
not see itself as a principles-based regulator, so much as a risk-based, outcome-oriented, 
cost-effective, consultative, and management-based one. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., 
ANNUAL REPORTS 11 (2002–03), available at http://www.fsa. 
gov.uk/pubs/annual/ar02_03/ar02?03.pdf; FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FINANCIAL SERVICES 
AUTHORITY: AN OUTLINE 31–33 (1997), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
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Accords
53
 are an essentially principles-based transnational agreement, 
this time governing supervision of banks. I have argued elsewhere that 
principles-based regulation in securities law should be seen as a new 
governance approach to regulation,
54
 and propose to use that lens here in 
describing the troubles that devolution, when not accompanied by 
adequate regulatory oversight, can pose for new governance scholarship. 
In the context of statutory drafting, more principles-based (as 
opposed to rules-based) regulation means legislation that contains more 
directives that are cast at a higher level of generality. But statutory 
drafting is only a small, formal, and ultimately inessential component of 
principles-based regulation.
55
 The essential components of a principles-
 
policy/launch.pdf. The principles-based turn came later. The frequency of use of the term 
―more principles-based‖ had increased by orders of magnitude by late 2006 or early 
2007. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth., FSA Business Plan Focuses on More 
Principles-Based Regulation (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/ 
Library/Communication/PR/2007/019.shtml. 
 53. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT‘L SETTLEMENTS, 
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A 
REVISED FRAMEWORK (2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/B.C.bs107.pdf 
[hereinafter 2004 BASEL II ACCORDS]. 
 54. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, supra note 14, at 5–6. The term 
―principles-based regulation‖ is the dominant one in securities regulation, likely for path-
dependent reasons stemming from post-Enron worries about whether U.S. GAAP rules 
were too rules-based. However, some scholars would argue that new governance methods 
transcend the rules-versus-principles debate. See Kathleen G. Noonan et al., Legal 
Accountability in the Service-Based Welfare State: Lessons from Child Welfare Reform, 
34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 523, 536–37, 554–56 (2009) (arguing that new governance, or 
―experimentalist,‖ practice resolves ―the rules/standard antimony‖ debate through a 
―simultaneous emphasis on articulation and flexibility‖). These scholars argue, by 
contrast, that an experimentalist regime actually transcends the rules-versus-principles 
debate. Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, the fully articulated version of 
what I call principles-based regulation is not actually in tension with what Noonan et al. 
would describe. They find it most useful to frame the phenomenon as a pragmatic, 
practical method that bypasses an unproductive theoretical conversation. I find it most 
useful to describe essentially the same phenomenon by focusing on principles-based 
regulation as a first-order decision that reflects an appreciation of the relative capacities 
of legislative drafters, regulators, and industry actors. Nevertheless, my version of 
principles-based regulation calls for careful attention to implementation mechanisms that 
pull detailed industry knowledge into the articulation of those principles, in a way that is 
strongly similar to what Noonan et al. describe. 
 55. I am not alone in describing principles-based regulation as requiring more 
than principles-based drafting. See also Julia Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles-
Based Regulation 12 (Law, Soc‘y & Econ. Working Papers, 13/2008, 2008), available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/14726527/Forms-and-Paradoxes-of-Principles-Based-
Regulation-by-Julia-Black [hereinafter Black, Forms and Paradoxes ] (distinguishing 
―formal PBR,‖ meaning principles in the rule books; ―substantive PBR,‖ which has some 
of the operational elements of PBR but not principles on the rule books; ―full PBR,‖ 
exhibiting both principles in the rule books and a principles-based operational approach; 
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based approach are to be found at the level of implementation, in terms 
of the techniques that are developed to translate those principles into 
specific business conduct expectations in context-sensitive, flexible, 
dialogue-based ways. 
Structurally, the most profound differences between more 
principles-based and more rules-based approaches to securities 
regulation are in two areas: the proportion of decision making and 
interpretive power that is explicitly left to be filled in through the 
rulemaking function, rather than statutory drafting; and the proportion of 
outcome-oriented versus process-oriented statutory requirements. 
Principles-based regulation moves substantial authority over detailed 
requirements from legislator to regulator, to be addressed through its 
rule-making power. It also tends to be structured in a more outcome-
oriented, as opposed to process-oriented, manner, meaning that the 
regulator in turn devolves decision making over detailed process to the 
industry actors it regulates.
56
 Outcome-oriented regulation measures 
performance against regulatory goals, whereas process-based regulation 
measures compliance with detailed procedural requirements.
57
 
As a regulatory strategy, outcome orientation has a clear new 
governance cast to it. It also has important implications for the approach 
to regulation. By definition, outcome-oriented regulation recognizes that 
there may be more than one means (i.e., more than one process) through 
which to achieve a regulatory goal. It transfers decision making about 
detailed process from regulators to industry. For its proponents, 
outcome-oriented regulation establishes a more direct relationship 
between regulatory goals and regulatory requirements, thereby making 
more efficient use of regulatory and industry resources. By contrast, 
process-oriented requirements that are developed by regulators in 
advance, in disregard of the fact that regulators possess less contextual 
information than industry actors, may not be perfectly tailored to 
regulatory goals. Process-oriented regulation can also permit market 
participants to abide by the letter of the law while ignoring its spirit. This 
 
and ―polycentric PBR,‖ which is full PBR with the additional element of incorporating 
third parties into the regulatory process). 
 56. See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES-BASED REGULATION: FOCUSING ON 
THE OUTCOMES THAT MATTER 4, 6–7, 9, 12 (2007), available at http://www.fsa. 
gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf. 
 57. In actual practice, there is no necessary disconnect between outcome-
oriented regulation and a third approach that some scholars call management-based 
regulation. See Coglianese & Lazer, supra note 12, at 692, 694. There are differences 
between the two concepts in terms of at what stage of firm conduct the regulator 
intervenes, but both place responsibility for detailed decision-making with industry 
actors, and give those actors the flexibility to design mechanisms that work for them 
based on their greater knowledge about their own businesses. 
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is especially the case when it comes to highly complex instruments, or 
areas where events are fast-moving and regulators on their own (let alone 
legislatures!) could not hope to keep up with the pace of innovation. 
Fundamental to a principles-based system is the existence or 
development of an ―interpretive community‖58 that collectively develops, 
on a rolling basis, the detailed content of statutory principles. In order to 
function transparently and predictably, a principles-based system must 
build in mechanisms that allow regulators to communicate with industry 
about their expectations, and that both allow and require industry to 
speak openly and regularly with regulators about their processes. 
Communication can take place through a number of channels including 
official administrative guidance, speeches, ―no action‖ letters, 
compliance audits, the incorporation and dissemination of good or best 
practices, comments on industry standards, or specific enforcement 
actions.
59
 Over time, such communication can help develop an 
interpretive community that understands regulatory expectations, and can 
usefully interpret regulatory pronouncements about ―reasonableness‖ or 
―effectiveness‖ in different situations.60 
What principles-based securities regulation means, then, is a 
particular way of structuring regulation, not a decision to do away with 
rules. Principles-based regulation is based on the conviction that while 
legislators and statutory drafters have the public legitimacy to establish 
broad regulatory goals, they are not in the best position to develop 
detailed guidelines for industry conduct, especially in fast-moving arenas 
like securities regulation. Those powers are allocated to frontline 
regulators at the relevant securities commission, whose expertise derives 
from their proximity to industry and whose accountability derives from 
the notice-and-comment aspect of their rulemaking powers. Moreover, 
and crucially, even those frontline regulators are limited in their access to 
information by comparison to the industries they regulate. These are the 
parties thought to be in the best position to both assess and bear their 
 
 58. JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 30–37 (1997); STANLEY FISH, IS 
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 354–57 
(1980); Julia Black, Talking About Regulation, PUB. L. 77, 77 (1998); Sol Picciotto, 
Constructing Compliance: Game Playing, Tax Law, and the Regulatory State, 29 LAW & 
POL‘Y 11 (2007). 
 59. On best practices and critical success factors in principles-based regulation 
see, e.g., Julia Black et al., Making a Success of Principles-Based Regulation, 1 LAW & 
FIN. MKTS. REV. 191 (2007). 
 60. Don Langevoort makes the thought-provoking argument that this kind of 
collaborative regulation is more likely to be successful in small and socially 
interconnected sectors. Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the 
Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025 (2009). Retail-heavy 
markets like the American one may have to rely more heavily on ex-post enforcement, 
despite its disadvantages. Id. 
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own risks. In order to stay relevant and informed about fast-moving 
industry practice, to keep regulation sufficiently flexible, and to avoid 
inhibiting productive innovation, regulators need to establish open and 
perpetual communication lines with industry. They need to use industry‘s 
own good and best practices to add the ―meat‖ of detail to the ―bones‖ of 
their principles-based regulatory expectations. 
International banking regulation, in the form of the Basel II Capital 
Accord,
61
 shares similar assumptions. It establishes high-level, outcome-
oriented requirements around the amount of capital that financial 
institutions need to maintain in reserve, and then devolves the process-
based risk assessment details to the institutions themselves.
62
 The greater 
risk a financial institution was carrying, the greater its reserves had to 
be.
63
 Basel II capital adequacy formulae, in turn, were incorporated in 
2004 into the United States Securities and Exchange Commission‘s 
alternative net capital requirements for leading broker-dealers, under the 
Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) Program.
64
 The CSE Program, 
which was voluntary,
65
 gave the leading ―shadow banks‖ operating in the 
United States the same leeway that international banks had to assess their 
own capital reserve levels. 
 
 61. See 2004 BASEL II ACCORDS, supra note 53. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers that Are Part of 
Consolidated Supervised Entities, Exchange Act Release No. 34-49830, 69 Fed. Reg. 
34,428 (June 21, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/34-49830.pdf. The 
text of the rule acknowledges that a ―broker-dealer‘s deductions for market and credit 
risk probably will be lower under the alternative method of computing net capital than 
under the standard net capital rule.‖ Id. To be eligible to use the alternative method of 
computing net capital, the broker-dealer had to maintain tentative net capital (meaning 
net capital before deducting securities haircuts and charges on inventory) of at least $1 
billion and net capital of at least $500 million. Id. It also had to have in place 
comprehensive internal risk management procedures that addressed market, credit, 
liquidity, legal, and operational risk at the firm, and to observe certain disclosure 
requirements vis-à-vis the SEC. Id. The ultimate holding company of those broker-
dealers—which were global financial institutions operating in the shadow banking 
sector—also had to consent to certain disclosure and risk assessment protocols, to permit 
the SEC to examine it and its affiliates, and monthly to compute capital requirements and 
risk in accordance with Basel standards. Id. The Program was terminated in September 
2008. Press Release, SEC, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Supervised 
Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/ press/2008/2008-230.htm. 
 65. SEC, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OFFICE OF AUDITS, REPORT NO. 446–A, 
SEC‘S OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED 
SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 81 (2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf [hereinafter, CSE REPORT]. That the CSE Program was 
voluntary was reportedly a function of the fact that no U.S. agency had regulatory 
authority over certain investment bank holding companies. Id. 
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The alternative net capital requirements established under Basel II 
and the CSE Program are technical rules whose details do not need to be 
recited here. The point for current purposes is that the overall strategy of 
establishing capital adequacy requirements based on internal firm risk 
modeling failed dramatically. The nature of the modern structured 
financial products is relevant. Assessing risks associated with standard 
equity products is fairly straightforward. Regulators could likely assess 
establish decent estimates of those risks on their own. Many modern 
structured finance products, by contrast, are almost indescribably 
complex, and assessing the risks associated with them calls for high math 
and powerful modeling tools. Following (in the United States) the 
passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, the over-
the-counter market for derivatives, notably including subprime 
mortgage-based consolidated debt obligations and their squares and 
cubes, and credit default swaps, expanded massively.
66
 These structured 
financial products tend to be relatively illiquid (because they are traded 
over the counter, and not on exchanges which could enable more 
efficient price discovery); proprietary and non-standardized (and so 
difficult to compare); extraordinarily complex; and rapidly evolving.
67
 
As Basel II and the CSE Program implicitly acknowledged, regulators—
 
 66. See Stephen Labaton & Timothy L. O‘Brien, Financiers Plan to Put 
Controls on Derivatives, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1999, at C1 (discussing the move towards 
self-regulation in derivative markets, prior to the GFC); Testimony Concerning Turmoil 
in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, 
Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions Before S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, & Urban Affairs (2008) (statement of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2008/ts092308cc.htm (recognizing a 
lack of regulatory oversight in the market for CDSs and other derivative products). 
 67. They differ in their attributes, but most over-the counter (OTC) derivative 
contracts are at least documented under standard forms, known as Masters, created by the 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. See International Swap and 
Derivatives Association, Inc., http://www.isda.org (last visited Mar. 19, 2010). The 
United States Department of the Treasury recently presented a bill to Congress that 
would significantly augment private standardization initiatives. See Press Release, U.S. 
Dep‘t of the Treasury, Administration‘s Regulatory Reform Agenda Reaches New 
Milestone: Final Piece of Legislation Language Delivered to Capitol Hill (Aug. 11, 
2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg261.htm. The Treasury‘s bill would allow 
bank regulators to establish margin and capital requirements for banks entering into 
derivatives contracts; would require standardized OTC derivatives contracts to be cleared 
by a derivatives clearing organization regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission or the SEC; and would require banks to have their standardized contracts 
centrally cleared and traded over regulated exchanges. Id. Dealers, also, would no longer 
be able to directly trade standardized derivatives contracts among themselves, but would 
be required to use an exchange or equivalent trading platform. Id. 
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let alone a disclosure-oriented regulator like the SEC
68—could not hope 
to adequately assess the risks associated with these products themselves. 
Moreover—and here is a clear lesson for new governance—the 
inadequacy of Basel II style capital adequacy conditions were virtually a 
laboratory experiment of the failure of the kind of decentralized, firm-
based contextual information gathering and process development that 
underpins new governance and principles-based systems. Firms‘ self-
interest, competence, and understanding of their own businesses were 
expected to keep the Basel II capital reserve system viable. As it turned 
out, in the absence of external discipline, the bank-developed models 
produced extraordinarily insufficient capital reserves, unprecedentedly 
high leverage, and enormous systemic risk.
69
 
Regulatory faith in industry actors‘ competence, if not literally their 
bona fides, proved to have been misplaced to catastrophic effect. George 
Soros has charged that the GFC reflects a ―shocking abdication of 
responsibility‖ on the part of regulators.70 Investment banks and others 
engaged in originating, structuring and selling financial products 
engaged in breathtakingly bad behavior. There was real dishonesty.
71
 The 
firms also made grave errors in safeguarding even their own interests. In 
the hands of in-house financial economists, academic caveats about the 
limitations of EMT models
72
 as well as limits of valuation models were 
ploughed under.
73
 Predictable psychological irrationalities, including 
groupthink, overconfidence, self-serving biases, and excessive faith in 
―hard‖ numbers, also seem to have been at work within firms. They were 
not accounted for in the regulatory decision to devolve the details to 
industry. There is also a strong public choice narrative. Banks had little 
incentive to behave prudently in building tranches of consumer debt-
based securities because they sold them onto third parties, in a market 
 
 68. See, e.g., John C. Coffee & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the 
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 777–78 (2009). 
 69. Stephen Labaton, Agency’s ’04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and 
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1. 
 70. George Soros, The Worst Market Crisis in 60 Years, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23, 
2008, at 9. 
 71. See, e.g., Les Christie, Mortgage Fraud Still Soaring, CNN.COM, Aug. 26, 
2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/25/real_estate/soaring_mortgage_fraud/ 
index.htm; Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Apr. 27, 2008, at 
MM36. 
 72. For a discussion of the future of the ―efficient-markets hypothesis‖ see 
Efficiency and Beyond, ECONOMIST, July 18, 2009. 
 73. See, e.g., Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 4, 2009, 
at MM24 (describing oversimplification of the VAR model in banking practice); Felix 
Salmon, A Formula for Disaster, WIRED MAG., Mar. 2009, at 74 (describing 
oversimplification of Li‘s gaussian cupola in banking practice). 
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eager to buy them.
74
 At a structural level, financial institutions may have 
focused on short-term gain at the expense of long-term value because 
they had become public corporations, not partnerships, and because bank 
CEOs were compensated based on short term earnings.
75
 
Regulators also seem to have underestimated the degree to which 
industry actors would use the available flexibility to try to avoid or 
circumvent regulatory oversight. Whether out of short-term self-interest, 
economic pressure, or simple lack of understanding,
76
 firms within the 
CSE Program that applied the alternative net capital requirements valued 
illiquid assets too generously, underestimated long tail risks, and 
maintained inadequate capital buffers, all the while taking the position 
that their behavior was reducing rather than exacerbating risk. They 
innovated in structured products, not only reflecting increasing 
sophistication or in order to make their product more attractive to 
purchasers, but also sometimes to avoid regulation.
77
 They avoided 
comparability in order to reduce transparency and arguably to make it 
harder for regulators to understand what they were selling.
78
 
Each of these factors, even in isolation, represents a considerable 
challenge to what Julia Black has termed the ―regulatory Utopia,‖ within 
which the self-examining, responsible firm, which possesses the greatest 
 
 74. Ben S. Bernanke, Remarks at the Sandridge Lecture, Virginia Association 
of Economics (Mar. 10, 2005), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2005/200503102/ (referring to a global ―saving glut‖). 
 75. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. 
L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1410072; see also Michael Lewis, The End, CONDE NAST PORTFOLIO, Dec.-
Jan. 2008–09, at 114 (blaming Wall Street excesses on the decision to take investment 
banks public). 
 76. David Brooks, Op.-Ed., Greed and Stupidity, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2009, at 
A29 (contrasting two theories explaining decision-making failures at financial 
institutions). Precisely why financial institutions managed risk so poorly is an important 
question, the answer to which is also multi-factorial and variable from one firm to 
another. 
 77. This may be the least of it. As Martin Wolf has pointed out, ―an enormous 
part of what banks did in the early part of this decade—the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the 
derivatives and the ‗shadow banking system‘ itself—was to find a way round regulation.‖ 
Martin Wolf, Comment, Reform of Regulation has to Start by Altering Incentives, FIN. 
TIMES, June 23, 2009, at 11. 
 78. See JONATHAN GOLIN, COVERED BONDS: BEYOND PFANDBRIEFE – 
INNOVATIONS, INVESTMENT AND STRUCTURED ALTERNATIVES 323 (2006) (indicating the 
lack of legislation in the American market for covered bonds, which produces products 
which lack the standardization and comparability of their European counterparts). Recent 
legislative initiatives have seen an interest in standardizing certain OTC derivative 
products, in an effort to mitigate systemic risk, see, e.g., “Over-the-Counter Derivatives” 
Before the S. Subcomm. on Secs., Ins., and Inv. (June 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/white20090622a.htm (statement of 
Patricia White, Associate Director, Division of Research Statistics). 
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contextual information, helps to elaborate the content of principles-based 
regulation through ongoing dialogue with a flexible and outcome-
oriented regulator, in the service of the mutual goal of optimized 
regulation.
79
 
Meanwhile, regulators at the SEC and elsewhere were dealing with 
an inadequate regulatory mandate and insufficient resources. For 
example, the SEC‘s Division of Trading and Markets had only seven 
staffers and no Executive Director.
80
 Yet since March 2007 it was 
charged the CSE Program—that is, with overseeing five otherwise-
unregulated major broker-dealer firms, which formed the backbone of 
the U.S.-based shadow-banking industry, based on a novel alternative 
capital adequacy method.
81
 One of the effects of understaffing was that 
Trading and Markets staff had not completed any inspections of its 
subject firms in the eighteen months prior to the collapse of Bear Stearns 
in September 2008.
82
 CSE staff failed to adequately track material issues 
in regulated firms, approved changes to capital requirements before 
completing full inspections, and failed to exchange information with 
other SEC divisions.
83
 This would have been problematic in any event, of 
course, but it was even more catastrophic in an outcome-oriented system 
where so much of the detailed procedural design for achieving regulatory 
goals was delegated to industry. 
The Northern Rock debacle in the United Kingdom highlighted very 
similar problems within its financial regulator, the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). The FSA was also far from adequately staffed. Its 
Major Retail Groups Division was reduced by some twenty staff between 
2004 and 2008, notwithstanding that Division‘s responsibility for 
substantial and complex FSA priorities such as Basel II and the Treating 
 
 79. Black, Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 55, at 7–12. 
 80. CSE REPORT, supra note 65, at 49. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 49–50. 
 83. Id. at 37–41. The SEC‘s failures in oversight do not appear to be limited to 
the CSE program. That agency‘s review of its failure to detect and prevent Bernard 
Madoff‘s fraud also records that Mr. Madoff‘s funds were overseen by inexperienced or 
unsuitably skilled staff who conducted inadequate examinations, failed to verify 
information, and failed to respond to ―red flags.‖ SEC, OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS, 
REPORT NO. OIG-509, INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD 
MADOFF‘S PONZI SCHEME – PUBLIC VERSION 23, 29, 31, 144 (Aug. 31, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm. Investigations were also 
delayed, questions were left unresolved, and SEC offices failed to communicate with 
each other. Id. The SEC‘s post-Madoff reforms include many of the initiatives 
recommended here, such as conducting surprise exams, recruiting staff with specialized 
experience, improving staff training, and seeking more resources. SEC, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission Post-Madoff Reforms (Dec. 7, 2009), http://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/secpostmadoffreforms.htm. 
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Customers Fairly initiative, in addition to its core firm risk assessment 
work.
84
 The postmortem account of regulatory failure in the Northern 
Rock case identified a number of instances in which the FSA failed to 
collect, or did not have access to, the information necessary to accurately 
access the systemic risk that bank posed.
85
 Supervisors were found not to 
have been ―proactive in ensuring there was a robust process that meant 
they built up a complete picture of issues.‖86 The FSA acknowledged 
extraordinarily high turnover of FSA staff directly supervising the bank, 
inadequate numbers of staff, and very limited direct contact with bank 
executives among the reasons for its ―unacceptable‖ regulatory 
performance.
87
 
In retrospect, programs like the CSE Program and the FSA‘s 
understaffed application of principles-based regulation are internally 
incoherent, at least if one believes in a role for public regulation. On one 
hand, regulators justified the delegation of risk assessment to firms on 
the basis that regulators did not and could not possess the knowledge 
those firms had about their own operational risks. Yet, the compensatory 
steps that might have reduced the knowledge gap and ensured sufficient 
oversight—compliance audits, close supervision by adequate numbers of 
well-trained staff—were not taken. Whether because the regimes‘ 
regulator-level architects accepted too unthinkingly the laissez-faire 
ethos of recent years,
88
 or because they had no choice given their lack of 
regulatory mandate from legislators
89
 (and these two are connected), 
regulatory programs like the SEC‘s CSE Program lacked a commitment 
to a robust public role in either design or implementation. 
 
 84. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTERNAL AUDIT DIVISION, THE SUPERVISION OF 
NORTHERN ROCK: A LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 7, 108–21 (2008), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk.pubs/other/nr_report.pdf. 
 85. Id. at 13–59. 
 86. Id. at 5. But see Norma Cohen & Chris Giles, Northern Rock Risk Revealed 
in 2004, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 2009, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/0/4cc9637a-4c8a-11de-a6c5-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1 (reporting that 
the FSA had conducted ―war games‖ in 2004 that identified the systemic risk that 
Northern Rock posed). 
 87. Hector Sants, Chief Executive, Financial Services Authority, Speech at the 
FSA Annual Public Meeting (July 24, 2008), http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/ 
Library/Communication/Speeches/2008/0724_hs.shtml. 
 88. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO 
THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 45–49 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov. 
uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW] (criticizing the FSA for 
adopting ―laissez faire‖ mentality); Labaton, supra note 69 (noting that ―[t]he 
commission‘s decision effectively to outsource its oversight to the firms themselves fit 
squarely in the broader Washington culture of the last eight years under President Bush‖). 
 89. CSE REPORT, supra note 65, at 81–82 (Chairman Cox‘s comments 
justifying CSE program on the basis that it was voluntary and the SEC did not have a 
mandate to regulate CSEs otherwise). 
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C. Clever People: Destabilization, Complexity, and Power in 
Securitization Practice 
As alluded to above, the over-the-counter market for derivatives 
expanded enormously in the years leading up to the GFC, and has been 
highly under-regulated.
90
 Devolution accompanied by an ideology of 
self-regulation was especially problematic because of the conditions of 
extraordinary complexity that characterized these products and the 
market for them. The second narrative focused on the troubles caused by 
devolving risk assessment to private parties under the Basel II and CSE 
Program initiatives, without ensuring meaningful regulatory oversight. 
This next narrative tries to confront a phenomenon that is equally 
relevant to the financial crisis and to new governance thinking, but also 
thornier. 
At the core of new governance is an embrace of the challenge and 
the promise of destabilization and social plasticity.
91
 New governance 
values incrementalism and learning-by-doing, as it should, because new 
governance starts from the premise that in an increasingly complex and 
decentered (or at least polycentric and networked) world, the path to 
human flourishing is through permitting innovation and parallel 
experimentation, and creating flexible and revisable structures that open 
the door to new possibilities.
92
 The difficulty is that bold, decentralized 
innovation and the deconstruction of traditional legal structures were 
centrally implicated in the GFC, in the form of structured finance 
products. The point here is certainly not that the innovations that took 
place in structured finance represent a new governance regime in some 
fashion. They do not. All the same, their story is a cautionary tale about 
some potential effects of innovation and complexity on transparency, 
accountability, and power. 
Briefly, a derivative is a financial product whose value is derived 
from the value of one or more underlying assets. The underlying asset 
can be virtually anything—a currency index, a loan agreement, or a 
company‘s shares—but the most familiar kinds of derivatives are options 
and swaps based on the value of underlying corporate shares. Options, 
swaps, and analogous tools have been used for years to fine-tune 
particular investment strategies; to hedge against risks associated with 
currency fluctuations, company performance, credit, and other relevant 
 
 90. See Labaton & O‘Brien, supra note 66. 
 91. See generally Simon & Sabel, supra note 7. The concept of destabilization 
rights is borrowed from Unger. See, e.g., ROBERTO UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY 1–8, 530–
32 (1987). I am not suggesting that new governance envisions a world as plastic as Unger 
does. See infra notes 134-136 and accompanying text. 
 92. See generally Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7. 
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variables; and to speculate on the same things. Securitization is a second 
order process that, in one version, uses derivatives to transform an 
illiquid asset pool (for example, a collection of subprime mortgages), 
structured through a conduit entity or special purpose vehicle, into 
multiple, credit-ratable tranches of sellable new securities.
93
 A 
securitized product based on underlying debt obligations, such as 
mortgages or consumer credit card debt, is a consolidated debt obligation 
(CDO). CDOs require considerable financial expertise to structure, but 
while notorious, they—and the credit default swaps, or CDSs, that were 
designed to serve as a form of insurance for them—are not the most 
complex structured products that have been developed by financial 
institutions. Global financial firms produced an ever greater volume of 
ever-more-complex synthetic securities in recent years, and it all sold.
94
 
Securitization can bring real benefits in terms of hedging and risk 
management. After a certain point, however, those benefits are extracted 
and additional innovation exists primarily to serve speculators, to move 
risk downstream, and to generate book-level financial value that exists at 
a metaphysical remove from the ―real‖ economy. This poses great risk to 
systemic stability. Even taken on their own terms—in terms of the 
benefits that structured products confer for fine-tuning risk profiles and 
improving investor choice—by design or in effect, at some point the 
costs of innovative new products outweigh their benefits to overall social 
welfare. As the March 2009 Turner Review from the United Kingdom 
suggested, the GFC has challenged the ―underlying assumption of 
financial regulation in the US, the UK and across the world . . . that 
financial innovation is by definition beneficial, since market discipline 
will winnow out any unnecessary or value destructive innovations.‖95 On 
the contrary, in retrospect, some recent forms of financial innovation 
delivered few benefits, but permitted rent-seeking and contributed to 
significantly increased levels of systemic risk.
96
 As the Turner Review 
noted, 
 
 93. See, e.g., Ian Bell & Petrina Dawson, Synthetic Securitization: Use of 
Derivative Technology for Credit Transfer, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT‘L L. 541 (2002); 
Michael Durrer, Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduits, 1 N.C. BANKING INST. 119 
(1997). Not incidentally, conduits also allowed banks to move debt off their balance 
sheets and to maintain less capital on hand for purposes of Basel II and the CSE Program. 
Other significant difficulties with the incentive structures around structured finance, 
including the fact that through CDSs one could effectively buy more protection than one 
had risk exposure, are beyond this Article‘s scope. 
 94. See Bernanke, supra note 74 (discussing the global ―saving glut‖ and its 
effect on the U.S. current account deficit); Lewis, supra note 75 (discussing the subprime 
mortgage crisis). 
 95. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 88, at 49. 
 96. Id. at 109. 
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it seems likely that some and perhaps much of the structuring 
and trading activity involved in the complex version of 
securitised credit [over the last ten to fifteen years], was not 
required to deliver credit intermediation efficiently. Instead, it 
achieved an economic rent extraction made possible by the 
opacity of margins, the asymmetry of information and 
knowledge between end users of financial services and 
producers, and the structure of principal/agent relationships 
between investors and companies and between companies and 
individual employees.
97
 
Derivatives and the development of increasingly sophisticated 
structured financial products have also increased uncertainty and 
destabilized preexisting accommodations in at least two significant ways. 
First, at the corporate-law level, derivatives have ―shattered the atom‖ of 
property well beyond anything contemplated by Berle and Means.
98
 This 
has reduced transparency, undermined corporate governance principles, 
and put even greater power into the hands of the most powerful and 
sophisticated market actors. Second, the origination and sale of 
securitized products have introduced enormous complexity into global 
financial markets. This has affected those markets‘ functioning, and 
presents a profound challenge to their regulation. 
The effect of the derivatives revolution
99
 on corporate law and 
governance have been described in a series of articles by Henry T.C. Hu 
and Bernard Black.
100
 As they point out, corporate governance has long 
been premised on a proportional relationship between economic interest 
and shareholder votes: one share, one vote.
101
 This relationship gives 
 
 97. Id. at 49. 
 98. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 8–9 (1932). 
 99. The term is not a new one. For a prescient analysis of the systemic risk 
associated with widespread use of over-the-counter derivatives, see Mary L. Schapiro, 
Comm‘r, SEC, Remarks at the Eighth Annual Symposium for the Foundation for 
Research in International Banking and Finance: The Derivatives Revolution and the 
World Financial System (Oct. 14, 1993), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
speech/1993/101493schapiro.pdf [hereinafter Schapiro Remarks]. 
 100. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt 
Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 
(2008) [hereinafter Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling ]; Henry T.C. Hu & 
Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) 
Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811–908 (2006) [hereinafter Hu & Black, The New Vote 
Buying ]. In September 2009, Professor Hu was appointed the first Director of the SEC‘s 
newly established Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation. Press Release, 
SEC, SEC Announces New Division of Risk, Strategy, & Financial Innovation (Sept. 16, 
2009), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-199.htm. 
 101. Hu & Black, The New Vote Buying, supra note 100, at 851–52. 
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shareholders the incentive to exercise their voting power responsibly, 
makes possible the market for corporate control, and legitimizes the 
power of management. Derivatives have the power to sever that 
relationship. They allow investors (often, hedge funds) as well as 
corporations to engage in what Hu and Black call ―the new vote buying,‖ 
by decoupling voting rights from economic ownership.
102
 
For example, a shareholder can use equity swaps or options to hold 
more votes, as of the record date for a shareholder vote, than it actually 
owns.
103
 Holding a disproportionate number of votes has clear 
implications in a proxy fight. In an extreme situation, it can even mean 
that a vote holder has a negative economic interest in the wellbeing of 
the company and, thus, an incentive to vote in ways that reduce share 
value.
104
 The opposite phenomenon is ―hidden,‖ or ―morphable,‖ 
ownership, through which a shareholder uses derivatives, such as equity 
swaps, to maintain a greater economic interest in a company than it has 
votes. Hu and Black describe this as ―morphable‖ voting rights, because 
the shareholder often maintains the de facto ability to acquire the votes if 
needed, for example by unwinding its swaps.
105
 Ownership is ―hidden‖ in 
that the shareholder‘s economic stake and de facto voting ownership are 
often not disclosed. The ability to make one‘s voting rights disappear 
when one wants to hide a stake, only to reappear when needed, has 
obvious implications in the takeover context, and the decoupling of 
voting right from economic interest has significant effects for corporate 
law and governance generally.
106
 
Moreover, Hu and Black assert that this decoupling is really just one 
instance of a broader, global trend, generally not addressed by regulation, 
toward decoupling the bundles of rights and obligations we traditionally 
know as equity and debt.
107
 It bears noting that sophisticated parties are 
the ones most able to take advantage of the power of this flexibility, 
which is beyond the capacity of small or retail investors. The collapse of 
structure and the increased irrelevance of formal voting rights for all 
shareholders benefits the powerful.
108
 
In addition to undermining conventional corporate governance 
mechanisms and notions of property, derivatives beget complexity. One 
of the striking lessons from the GFC has been the impact of complexity 
 
 102. Id. at 823. 
 103. Id. at 825. 
 104. Id. at 832–35. 
 105. Id. at 825–26. 
 106. Id. at 836–42, 850–63. 
 107. See generally Hu & Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling, supra note 100. 
 108. Cf., e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 146–
49 (1991). 
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on the financial markets, and the degree to which existing regulatory 
structures failed to manage its effects. Steven Schwarcz has suggested, 
plausibly, that complexity is the ―greatest financial market challenge of 
the future.‖109 He describes complexity in the assets that underlie modern 
structured financial products—for example, variability in property 
values, interest rates, mortgage terms, and the creditworthiness of 
individual mortgagees
110—over layered with complexity in the design of 
the structured products themselves—for example, in the design of 
synthetic products so complex that adequate disclosure to investors was 
virtually impossible
111—and exacerbated by complexity in modern 
financial markets (including indirect holding systems and the widespread 
use of complex mathematical risk modeling).
112
 Schwarcz examines how 
these multiple complexities can lead to inappropriate lending standards, 
failures of disclosure, and a lack of transparency and even 
comprehensibility.
113
 Perhaps most difficult to manage, they also create a 
complex system characterized by intricate causal relationships and a 
―tight coupling‖ within credit markets, in which events tend to amplify 
each other and move rapidly into crisis mode.
114
 Prior to the GFC, there 
was a general failure by all concerned to appreciate the myriad 
interrelated ways in which complexity can impair markets and financial 
regulation. 
III. LESSONS LEARNED 
The three narratives above are pitched in different registers, though 
all are stories through which one can try to understand how financial 
regulation functions. Each one also offers lessons for new governance 
scholarship, especially around three key concepts: incrementalism, 
capacity, and plasticity. 
A. Does Incrementalism Mean More of the Same? 
As a design strategy, there are reasons to prefer experience-based 
incrementalism to solo-designed regulatory reform undertaken by even 
the most talented and experienced observers. Knowledge is dispersed 
 
 109. Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 
WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2–3, on file with author), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract =1240863. 
 110. Id. at 7–11. 
 111. Id. at 11–25. 
 112. Id. at 25–32. 
 113. Id. at 7–11. 
 114. Id. at 25–31. 
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within society, redundancy and parallel experiments are useful learning 
methods, and the extent of what we do not know is great enough that the 
potential for activating unintended consequences must be seen as a real 
risk. 
At the same time, incrementalism inevitably reflects surrounding 
conditions. It may be a powerful tool for change over time, but the 
direction of that change will be a product of myriad distinct decisions 
made along the way, and those decisions will be a function of the 
interests of those making them and the extent of their influence. New 
governance scholarship is preoccupied with the fascinating possibilities 
inhering in incrementalism—and indeed, many large and beneficial 
changes have been produced through incremental, pragmatic action. It is 
one of the key insights of new governance that one should design 
deliberative and regulatory regimes that can capture and fine-tune that 
progress by reflecting learning back to those doing the doing, evaluate it 
based on sound and revisable methods, and roll that learning back into 
the regime itself. 
As important as this is, it would be unwise to underestimate the 
amount of energy and focus required to push incremental change (or 
even to identify its direction, given the background noise) in the direction 
of prior commitments and empirically demonstrable improvement. 
Moreover, under stable background conditions and without that 
enormous input of energy, incremental movement is very likely to reflect 
status quo priorities and power relations. Consider the example of 
monitorships. In many (though not all) of the monitorships we studied, 
incremental decisions taken at each stage meant that at no stage was 
there a true destabilization along the lines imagined by new governance 
scholarship. There was no opening up of the process to a more diverse 
set of interests. 
In practical terms, the ―local level‖ in new governance regulation 
cannot be a black box. Moreover, we cannot presume that public-
regarding or long term thinking will automatically be produced at this 
level. Without a considerable oversight mechanism that tests those 
groups‘ assumptions, those groups will develop suboptimal resolutions. 
For example, a local level comprised of self-interested bankers cannot be 
counted on to self-regulate effectively where no one is acting as an 
active, public-regarding counterweight in their interpretive community. 
What this means is that we should perhaps be wary of industry efforts 
toward ―pre-emptive self-regulation.‖ We should not assume that 
regulators will necessarily be able to adapt measures that were initially 
taken to pre-empt regulation into a more consequential project. At a 
minimum, the monitorship story here points to features that have to be 
incorporated in order to translate self-regulation, especially of the pre-
emptive variety, to truly enforced self-regulation or co-regulation. Above 
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all, it would be essential to reinject meaningful contestation and 
diversity. Without structural avenues for intervention by those with 
allegiances truly ―outside the circle,‖115 we should anticipate seeing 
closed, non-diverse, and ultimately unaccountable systems. 
B. Who Cares About Regulatory Capacity? The Tendency to Slide 
Downhill 
The absence of meaningful accountability meant that Basel II and 
the CSE Program effectively ran downhill toward self-regulation. This 
need not have been the case. Devolution does not automatically imply 
weak public oversight or irresponsible private action. The Turner 
Review, produced by the FSA‘s now-Chairman, Lord Adair Turner is 
insightful in describing the regulatory worldview that made possible 
regulatory failure on the scale we have seen.
116
 According the Turner 
Review, the FSA did not fail because it embraced principles-based 
regulation.
117
 Rather, Lord Turner ascribes blame to flaws in FSA 
philosophy—that is, to a hands-off, market-based regulatory approach 
that assumed that markets were generally self-correcting and that market 
discipline could be counted on to contain risk; that primary responsibility 
for managing risk lay with senior management, not regulators, because 
they possessed better information; and that consumers were best 
protected through unfettered and transparent markets, not product 
regulation or direct intervention.
118
 
New governance scholarship cuts across the proverbial 
public/private divide in many ways, one of which is that it takes 
seriously, as governance strategies, initiatives occurring within 
regulatory bodies,
119
 on the part of private actors,
120
 and at junctions in 
 
 115. This would include, for example, meaningful protections for corporate 
whistleblowers. See generally Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and 
the Laws of Overlapping Obligations, 2009 CAL. L. REV. 433. 
 116. TURNER REVIEW, supra note 88. 
 117. This notwithstanding premature and ultimately inaccurate reports by 
credible UK media sources that principles-based regulation would be abandoned. See 
Peter Thal Larsen & Jennifer Hughes, Sants Takes a Fresh View of Regulator’s 
Principles, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2009, at 17. 
 118. Just as fundamental, but best put in the category of regulatory gaps rather 
than regulatory approaches, was failure in the oversight of systemic risk. See TURNER 
REVIEW, supra note 88, at 52–53. 
 119. E.g., Dorf & Sabel, supra note 7; Noonan et al., supra note 54. 
 120. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (2008); Katharina 
Pistor, Global Network Finance: Organizational Hedging in Times of Uncertainty 
(Columbia Law & Economics, Working Paper No. 339, Oct. 14, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1284606. 
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between.
121
 One lesson that emerges from the failure of internal risk 
assessment under Basel II and the CSE Program is that, while 
traditionally ―public‖ and traditionally ―private‖ actors should not be 
drawn reductively, and while each can perform a range of different 
functions, they nevertheless operate from distinct starting positions. 
Neither group, of course, would want to see the financial system 
collapse, but in the shorter term private parties can be expected to be 
driven principally by profits, market share, and interfirm competition. 
We may hope for them to generate reputation-driven accountability 
measures in at least certain contexts,
122
 but in the meantime they are 
susceptible to taking shortcuts and satisficing in ways that may be 
individually beneficial even if they are collectively catastrophic. One 
cannot expect industry actors to act in the public interest, except insofar 
as that public interest conforms to their understanding of their own 
(sometimes short term) self-interest, and there will be a non-negligible 
number of circumstances in which they will not conform. For example, 
each firm operating under the SEC‘s CSE Program had the incentive to 
minimize capital reserves and to maximize leverage, in the interest of 
maximizing profits. The result was a classic collective action problem.
123
 
Excessively deep faith in the public potential of self-interested 
private actors can impose other blinkers as well. One risk may be an 
unreflective over-embrace of localism and local knowledge. As new 
governance scholars know, the principle of subsidiarity asserts that 
responsibility for addressing a particular problem should be located at the 
most local level capable of handling it. In retrospect, if any party was in a 
position to assess the systemic risk that arose from the tightly 
interconnected conduct of the global banks in recent years, it could only 
plausibly have been a regulator. The assumption that local actors possess 
the best information seems to have been accepted too uncritically, and 
applied too sweepingly.
124
 
 
 121. See, e.g., Sabel & Simon, supra note 7 (describing situations in which 
private action can be catalyzed by a publicly mandated process); Joanne Scott & Susan 
Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in New Governance, 13 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 565 (2007); Sturm, supra note 8. 
 122. See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 120. 
 123. See Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on 
Buy-Outs, FIN. TIMES, July 9, 2007, at 1, available at http://www.ft.com/ 
cms/s/0/80e2987a-2e50-11dc-821c-0000779fd2ac.html (statement of Charles Prince, 
Citigroup CEO) (―As long as the music is playing you need to get up and dance.‖). 
 124. Cf. Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond 
Devolution, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001) (arguing that the conservative political spin the 
principle sometimes assumes misconstrues the public-minded Catholic social theory from 
which the principle arises). 
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Similarly, the Basel II Accord and CSE Program did not account for 
the possibility that self-interested private actors could collectively 
cascade into risky and irrational behavior. Information-based analysis 
and reason-giving (essential elements of new governance thinking)
125
 
also seem to collapse in times of economic exuberance, when those 
involved are more willing to suspend disbelief. Market bubbles may also 
be times when regulators‘ budgets are under pressure, because problems 
are not at the forefront of peoples‘ minds. The duty to give reasons and 
explain is further hampered by extreme complexity of the sort that 
characterizes modern financial markets. Being more flexible, new 
governance methods may reflect the zeitgeist more forcefully as well. 
Working effectively with principles-based regulation and similar 
decentered models therefore requires considerable changes to traditional 
regulatory culture, and considerable resources.
126
 Indeed, as Julia Black 
has pointed out—and this seems crucial for new governance generally—
principles-based regulation may be more ―hands-off‖ in its approach to 
the procedural details, but this does not mean that it requires fewer 
regulatory resources.
127
 Principles-based regulation may actually require 
intensive interaction with firms, at least around certain issues or 
situations.
128
 It means having an adequate number of staff, and giving 
regulators the ability to obtain transparent and reliable information from 
and about industry. It requires that regulators have and use robust 
investigatory powers where necessary, conduct regular and adequate 
compliance audits, and possess the quantitative expertise and relevant 
experience to independently scrutinize information. As one commentator 
observed, contemporary regulators need to be pursuing ―the same PhD 
rocket scientists the banks are chasing.‖129 Regulatory staffers also need 
sufficient confidence in their own judgment and a healthy degree of 
skepticism about industry. Yet, both the FSA and the SEC‘s CSE 
 
 125. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The 
Pragmatist Challenge to Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 181–82 (2004). 
 126. See, e.g., Black et al., Making a Success, supra note 59, at 201; Cristie L. 
Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 
55 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract 
=1516734. 
 127. Black et al., Making a Success, supra note 59, at 202. 
 128. See generally id. (discussing U.K. Treat Customers Fairly rules, which 
require registrants to demonstrate that they are in fact treating customers fairly at every 
stage). 
 129. Jennifer Hughes, FSA Admits Catalogue of Failures, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2008, at 3. The fact that quantitative analysis has been abused, misapplied, and 
overgeneralized in the past does not mean that banks will not use it in the future. Despite 
its theoretical limitations and the recent example of real-life catastrophe, quantitative 
analysis continues to have substantial predictive value, and it will continue to be a central 
tool for financial industry actors. 
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Program were under-resourced on virtually every measure.
130
 In a system 
where information is power, such as in the principles-based regulation of 
complex derivative instruments, a regulator without the ability to obtain 
and manage information cedes the field to those it regulates. 
Herein lies the problem. Who, precisely, can be relied on to ensure 
that such decentralized systems are accountable, and that learning truly is 
reflected upward and used effectively? Who has the incentive to do this 
rather than to ―satisfice‖? Consider again the example of corporate 
monitorships. Certainly, each of the prosecutor, the corporation, and the 
monitor had an interest in achieving some measurable positive effect 
through the process. But they also each had some degree of common 
interest in resolving the monitorship in the least destabilizing and most 
efficient manner possible. We should not then be surprised that, where 
there was room to satisfice, and given the absence of a forceful, external, 
destabilizing accountability mechanism, incremental decisions at each 
stage downgraded their potential effectiveness. Considering the lack of 
appetite for long-term, close monitoring of public companies—by 
securities regulators, let alone by criminal prosecutors—we may 
reasonably ask ourselves exactly how this regime could ever be robust.
131
 
The lesson seems to be that moving people and organizations out of 
complacent stasis (or, worse, regulatory collapse) and toward 
meaningful, accountable new governance functionality calls for a 
substantially larger push than the new governance literature always 
 
 130. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text. The FSA implemented a 
―supervisory enhancement program‖ in response to the failure of Northern Rock. See 
Hector Sants, Fin. Servs. Auth., The FSA‘s Supervisory Enhancement Programme, in 
Response to the Internal Audit Report on Supervision of Northern Rock, High Level 
Summary (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/ 
enhancement.pdf. It has announced plans to enhance its supervisory teams (meaning 
more staff, better training, a mandatory minimum number of staff per high-impact 
institution, and closer contact between senior staff and the biggest firms). Id. at 2. It also 
plans to improve the quality of its staff, hiring risk specialists to support frontline 
supervision teams by focusing on the complex models used by banks to gauge financial 
risk. Id. at 3. See also TURNER REVIEW, supra note 88, at 88 (describing the FSA‘s new 
approach as ―intensive supervision‖). Lord Turner describes intensive supervision as 
entailing much greater resources devoted to the supervision of high impact firms, more 
intense focus on business strategies and system-wide risks, more focus on technical 
competence of FSA supervisors, more focus on the details of bank accounting, and 
greater willingness to reach judgments about the overall risks that firms are running. Id. 
 131. See Ford & Hess, supra note 20, at 726 (discussing civil side regulators 
passing monitors‘ reports onto compliance for use as blueprints). That said, even within 
the civil regulatory context, there is a clear distinction between regulated entities and 
public companies in terms of follow-up and oversight. Broker-dealer firms and other 
regulated entities operate in a highly regulated environment and are required to be in 
contact with their regulators through a number of prescribed mechanisms. Nothing 
similar is required of public companies as a condition of listing, and most people would 
probably agree that nothing similar should be required. 
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acknowledges. Moreover, the push would have to be continuous and 
unrelenting, since the same tendencies toward satisficing, pie-dividing, 
and short term thinking will reemerge at many crucial decision points 
along the way. A new governance approach to regulation will be 
susceptible to downgrading throughout its life cycle. Designing a system 
that can maintain its integrity despite such human foibles will require a 
greater degree of ambition than has characterized many implementation 
efforts. 
C. Destabilization Rights and Prophylactic Rules 
New governance scholarship seeks to develop governance 
mechanisms that in terms of flexibility, effectiveness, and inclusiveness 
are superior to command-and-control mechanisms. This makes sense. In 
part, the roots of new governance thought (for example, in new public 
management or Japanese management models) represent a reaction to 
bureaucracies and hierarchies that had become ineffective because of 
over-reliance on rigid rule-making processes and centralized decision 
making structures, or because of co-optation by interest group politics. 
Today, the problems caused by derivatives and securitization reflect 
practically the opposite risk—innovation bounded only by the 
imagination, in a financial sector increasingly distanced from the ―real 
economy‖ and free from the constraining influences of rigid institutions 
and legal structures.
132
 Moreover, in real life that flexibility was not used 
in the service of greater emancipation or human potential.
133
 Until it 
proved to be to the detriment of everyone, financial product innovation 
primarily benefited financial firms themselves, at great cost to 
transparency and the possibility of oversight. We should therefore get 
clear about the boundaries of the destabilization right that is fundamental 
to new governance. 
Destabilization in new governance does not mean free-for-all 
plasticity. Radical uncertainty on its own it is neither necessary nor 
 
 132. See, e.g., Bell & Dawson, supra note 93, at 561 (suggesting that synthetic 
securitization ―is the second great leap forward in the road to a totally disintermediated 
financial world‖). 
 133. Contra UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 91, at 530 (―Destabilization 
rights protect the citizen‘s interest in breaking open the large-scale organizations or the 
extended areas of social practice that remain closed to the destabilizing effects of 
ordinary conflict and thereby sustain insulated hierarchies of power and advantage.‖); 
ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, SOCIAL THEORY: ITS SITUATION AND ITS TASK 210 (1987) 
(―The paramount condition of material progress [once poverty is overcome] becomes the 
plasticity of social life: the relative ease with which people can subject their forms of 
production and exchange, of machine design and work organization, to the logic of 
problem-solving.‖). 
FORD - READ THROUGH.DOC 6/9/2010 12:27 PM 
136 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 
sufficient to generate the conditions for human flourishing. New 
governance understands this, of course. It is not anarchism, or radical 
democracy theory, and it situates its destabilization mechanism within a 
matrix of abiding institutions.
134
 At the same time, conditions of deep 
instability are sometimes proposed as the moment when New 
Governance approaches stand the best chance of being realized—times 
when no one knows what the solution to a problem might be, or how to 
get there, but everyone knows that the status quo cannot persist.
135
 
Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott similarly describe a 
promising ―contracting for innovation‖ phenomenon arising around 
interfirm collaboration, as a response to what they understand as a 
problem of Knightian uncertainty.
136
 
Good and important things do happen in malleable environments. 
There is real power in the new governance conviction that moving 
people off their pre-existing positions can open new and unexpected 
possibilities. At the same time, we might be forgiven in this historical 
moment for fixating on the bad things that can also happen in malleable 
environments. The financial crisis is partly a story about the fallibility of 
industry actors in safeguarding their own enlightened self-interest, 
behaving rationally, and responding to (or perhaps even grasping) the 
systemic risk their conduct was generating. Considerable human 
experience in fact suggests that in the face of uncertainty, bounded 
human rationality has considerable presence. People may satisfice where 
possible to avoid the discomfort of uncertainty; will be more inclined to 
accept the status quo for the same reason; will have difficulty absorbing 
information that is inconsistent with their prior convictions and interests; 
and sometimes, may freeze up completely or revert to tribalism. 
As regulatory failure in principles-based regimes and Schwarcz‘s 
dissection of financial complexity show, unknowability is a real threat to 
systems based on information-forcing and analysis. In addition, power 
relationships assert themselves in fluid space, like the space created 
between ownership and voting rights through mechanisms such as empty 
voting and morphable ownership. Nontransparency can be beneficial to 
powerful actors. Those that profit from it will resist efforts to force 
 
 134. See, e.g., Noonan et al., supra note 54; Sabel & Simon, supra note 7; Scott 
& Sturm, supra note 121. 
 135. Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative 
Impulse, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2131–34 (2005) (arguing for open-ended formulations 
where the regulator ―knows the result it is trying to achieve but does not know the means 
for achieving it, when circumstances are likely to change in ways that the [regulator] 
cannot predict, or when the [regulator] does not even know the precise result that she 
desires‖). 
 136. Gilson et al., supra note 120. 
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transparency and accountability—and resist those efforts both overtly, 
and in hard-to-measure ways.
137
 
So, what to do? Unger‘s response to the derivatives problem would 
probably be that we have not gone far enough. The use of structured 
financial products has atomized equity, and debt, but a broadly available 
destabilization right (for example, a power to profoundly disrupt the 
status quo, available not only to shareholders but all stakeholders 
including creditors, employees, local communities, citizens writ large, 
and representatives of the global environment) did not follow.
138
 
Consolidated property holding, also, remains with us.
139
 The result is the 
persistence of a hollowed-out legacy mechanism for ensuring voice 
through shareholder voting, which is no longer connected to the central 
interests to be protected, and that is available to be used strategically by 
sophisticated parties. 
Be that as it may, both the GFC and the regulatory response to it 
suggest that the establishment of broadly available destabilization rights 
is unlikely to follow the disintegration of formal property rights. While it 
is theoretically possible that ―ungoverned‖ mechanisms can create rich 
accountability in the absence of formal mechanisms,
140
 this is not an 
inevitable outcome. All three narratives above demonstrate that in a 
world of imperfect information, complexity, and status quo bias, less 
happy results, which reflect existing power relationships, may result. 
 
 137. See Sturm, supra note 8 (identifying such problems of subtle resistance, and 
a solution based on building in responsive architecture rather than perpetuating 
plasticity). 
 138. Unger actually proposes four fundamentally restructured categories of 
rights: immunity rights, which protect the individual from the state, organizations, and 
other individuals; destabilization rights, which make it possible to dismantle institutions 
and practices that create social hierarchy and division; market rights, which constitute 
claims to social capital and replace conventional property rights; and solidarity rights, 
which are ―the legal entitlements of communal life.‖ UNGER, supra note 133, at 508–38. 
 139. For Unger, the traditional property right was an unhelpful formative context 
that impeded societal plasticity. Unger would disaggregate private property rights and 
transfer control over major productive assets to a ―rotating capital fund,‖ which would 
disaggregate property rights down through tiers: (1) an ultimate social fund controlled by 
government, leasing capital to (2) autonomous investment funds operating in different 
sectors, which then (3) auction or ration resources to competitive teams of producers for 
stipulated periods of time. UNGER, FALSE NECESSITY, supra note 91, at 491–501. Welfare 
rights guarantees to citizens would protect them from the vagaries of markets, which 
would also allow innovators (capital-takers) to be even more innovative and to take larger 
risks. See also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, DEMOCRACY REALIZED: THE PROGRESSIVE 
ALTERNATIVE 273–75 (1987). 
 140. See, e.g., Matthew C. Jennejohn, Collaboration, Innovation, and Contract 
Design, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 83, 86–87 & nn.12–14 (2008); Charles Sabel, 
Ungoverned Production, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 310 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004). 
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Even where acute problems associated with securitization are resolved, it 
is not clear from where the impetus will come to generate a fundamental 
revision of existing structures on Ungerian lines. 
Another response to the problems posed by securitization might be 
to try to reintroduce certainty in a convincing manner, for example by 
shoring up non-negotiable substantive rights.
141
 Leaving aside the 
considerable torque this would put on new governance methods, this 
does not seem realistic in this situation. There is virtually no hope of 
returning the twin genies of innovation and complexity in structured 
products to the bottle.
142
 The reassertion of facially straightforward rights 
cannot make a complex situation simple, or avoid the need for ongoing 
and explicit principles-based problem-solving that is designed to handle 
complexity. New governance needs to be understood as a response to 
those very real problems. 
Perhaps, though, in light of finite regulatory capacity and the clear 
necessity of decent prudential regulation for worldwide economic 
stability, prophylactic rules have a role to play. They are far from 
perfect, virtually by definition, but their overall costs may prove 
justifiable relative to the costs of complete new governance systems that 
are more iterative and complex ―all the way down,‖ if those complex 
systems exceed the capacity of regulators to regulate.
143
 
Without regulatory oversight, self-interested actors can be expected 
to act in their own interest. Where there is underlying uncertainty 
anyway—for example, around a new or extraordinarily complex product 
or line of business—or where there is no metric for evaluating something 
(a compliance program, a product, a risk) across institutions, the problem 
of self-interested action can be exacerbated.
144
 Collectively, the infamous 
―risky shift‖145 can occur, especially when markets are experiencing a 
 
 141. See, e.g., Lisa T. Alexander, Stakeholder Participation in New Governance: 
Lessons From Chicago’s Public Housing Reform Experiment, 16 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. 
& POL‘Y 117, 127–28, 180–84 (2009); Douglas NeJaime, When New Governance Fails, 
70 OHIO ST. L.J. 323 (2009) (making essentially this recommendation albeit in different 
contexts). 
 142. For example, one post-GFC innovation in securitization is based on ―life 
settlements.‖ Jenny Anderson, New Exotic Investments Emerging on Wall Street, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at A1. 
 143. On the other hand, prophylactic rules can impose considerable costs due to 
international regulatory arbitrage. The obvious response, which is international 
harmonization, remains elusive. I am grateful to Eric Pan for this observation. 
 144. See generally William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the 
Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999). 
 145. See, e.g., Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, 
and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); J.H. 
Davis, Group Decision and Social Interaction: A Theory of Social Decision Schemes, 80 
PSYCHOL. REV. 97 (1973). ―Risky shift‖ is part of a broader phenomenon of group 
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bubble or competitive pressures push actors toward greater risk-taking.
146
 
Without countervailing, independent-minded regulatory power to push 
back against self-interested industry conduct, the ―creep‖ may run 
downwards—to more risk, less transparency, less systemic stability, and 
less consumer protection. 
Meaningful regulatory oversight is therefore an important 
consideration, and complexity makes that oversight harder to achieve. 
We know now that our financial regulatory approaches were not built to 
handle the effects of complexity and constant innovation that 
characterize modern financial markets. The new governance approach 
regulation is, of course, a response to those very phenomena. But as John 
Coffee and Hillary Sale have argued, even an optimal regulatory model 
will not work if it is too complex for regulators to implement.
147
 If the 
alternative is a governance system without the capacity to provide 
meaningful oversight, then the (ultimately superficial) certainty provided 
by (inevitably imperfect) prophylactic rules may still be more functional 
than the flexibility and contextuality offered by the more sophisticated 
new governance approach. In other words, we need to take into account 
both theory and realistic prospects for effective implementation when 
deciding how to structure particular regulatory provisions. 
We may also want to consider the role that particular regulatory 
requirements play in overall system stability and efficiency. Rules 
around capital requirements, like much of prudential regulation, are so 
fundamental to effective functioning of the system that they should not 
necessarily be subject to contestation, innovation, and potential ―creep‖ 
through collaborative regulatory practice. The analogy in democratic 
theory would be to participation rights, seen by some to be so 
fundamental to deliberation that they should not themselves be subject to 
the risk of erosion in the process of that deliberative exercise.
148
 
 
polarization, referred to as ―choice shift‖ in more recent academic work, though in this 
case the narrower term ―risky shift‖ applies. 
 146. See Nakamoto & Wighton, supra note 123 (statement of Charles Prince) 
(―As long as the music is playing, you‘ve got to get up and dance.‖). 
 147. Coffee & Sale, supra note 68, at 742, 782 (claiming that Basel II criteria 
generated a ―very sophisticated tool that was beyond the capacity of the SEC‘s largely 
legal staff to administer effectively‖ and that simple, suboptimal might be capable of 
implementation while ―a more optimal rule (in terms of its theoretical design) may not 
be‖). 
 148. See, e.g., Scott & Sturm, supra note 121, at 567. Strong safeguards for 
participation rights, being fundamental to the new governance deliberative process, need 
to be distinguished from providing guarantees to particular substantive outcomes, like the 
―right of return‖ proposed in Alexander, supra note 141. There is an analogous debate in 
new governance scholarship about the degree of ―hard law‖ background measures needed 
(or assumed to exist) to safeguard participatory rights or address power disparities. See, 
e.g., Amy Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 
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Returning to Basel II and the CSE Program, capital requirements are 
a concrete example in which firms that were forced to observe more 
rigid, rule-based requirements weathered the acute phase of the fall 2008 
credit crisis better.
149
 In Canada, for example, capital requirements for 
financial institutions were comparatively high, and tended even to be 
exceeded by the actual practice of Canadian banks.
150
 Asset-to-capital 
ratios were capped at a comparatively low level.
151
 Canadian financial 
institutions‘ overall success in weathering the GFC has been often 
attributed to these regulatory restrictions.
152
 Another example of 
prophylactic provisions might be provisional contract term 
standardization. Especially with respect to derivative contracts, 
standardization can help cabin complexity, make innovation subject to a 
degree of price discovery and oversight, and make derivatives easier to 
regulate.
153
 
We should be careful not to overstate the lesson here. The fact that 
systems with rigid, mandatory capital requirements performed better 
during the financial crisis does not mean that such capital requirements 
will necessarily be better than any more flexible alternative, or that we 
can generalize from capital requirements to other areas of financial 
regulation. We did not learn that rigid capital requirements are better 
than any mechanism we could possibly imagine. They may not even be 
better than the CSE Program might have been, had it been buttressed by 
 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 543 n.47 (2008). Even assuming that capital requirements and 
other prudential measures are fundamental to financial markets‘ operation, a range of 
reasonable opinion could exist as to the optimal degree of flexibility for what I still 
maintain need to be prophylactic standards around them. 
 149. Andrea Beltratti & Rene Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better 
During the Credit Crisis?: A Cross Country Study of the Impact of Governance and 
Regulation (Fisher College of Business, Working Paper No. 2009-03-012, 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1433502 (finding that 
banks in countries with stricter capital requirement regulations and with more 
independent supervisors performed better in the July 2007 to December 2008 period). 
 150. See, e.g., Kevin G. Lynch, Clerk of the Privy Council, Secretary to the 
Cabinet and Head of the Public Service to the Hertie School of Governance, Remarks in 
Berlin, Germany: Public Policy Making in a Crisis: A Canadian Perspective (May 7, 
2009). 
 151. Id. 
 152. But see Lev Ratnovski & Rocco Huang, Why Are Canadian Banks More 
Resilient? (IMF Working Paper, WP/09/152, 2009), available at https://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/wp/2009/wp09152.pdf (identifying the ―key determinant‖ of Canadian 
banks‘ success as having a larger base of insured retail depositors). Other factors include 
steadier housing prices, a more unified regulatory structure, and the fact that mortgage 
lenders in Canada tend to hold the mortgages they extend. See Lynch, supra note 150; 
Ratnovski & Huang, supra, at 16–18; Fareed Zakaria, Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, 
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 16, 2009, at 31. 
 153. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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adequate regulatory capacity. Rigid requirements impose significant 
costs, as well. What we learned is that rigid capital requirements worked 
better than the flawed and basically unaccountable capital adequacy 
system that was in place under, for example, the SEC‘s CSE Program. 
It is helpful to see our current struggles with complexity as 
epistemological ones.
154
 Complexity is worrisome right now in part 
because, like the frozen credit markets in fall 2008, we do not know what 
we do not know. In time, based on greater understanding, we may be 
able to develop a more sophisticated approach to complexity, with more 
and different safeguards in place, which does not seem to force us to 
choose so starkly between flexibility and systemic stability. In other 
words, tools like bright line capital requirements should be cast as 
prophylactic, not permanent, rules. Prophylactic rules are clear and 
generally overdrawn requirements, like the Miranda rights-reading 
requirement on police in the United States, which serve as placeholders 
to protect an important interest until and unless a better, more tailored 
method for achieving the same end can be implemented.
155
 A ―better‖ 
approach to capital requirements would have to improve flexibility and 
congruence, but not at the expense of the transparency, accountability, 
and ease of application that rigid requirements provide in this crucial 
aspect of financial markets regulation.
156
 
Prophylactic rules are helpful in keeping essential systems 
functioning and in conserving regulatory resources. However, under 
 
 154. Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, The Epistemology of the Financial Crisis: Complexity, 
Causation, Law, and Judgment (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch., Legal Studies Research Paper 
No. 09–30, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1421837. 
 155. The term derives from American constitutional law theory, and is 
controversial in that context. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that 
certain warnings must be given before a suspect‘s statement made during custodial 
interrogation could be admitted in evidence). The case invited legislative action to protect 
the constitutional right against coerced self-incrimination, but stated that any legislative 
alternative must be ―at least as effective in appraising accused persons of their right of 
silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it.‖ Id. at 467. The Miranda 
warning requirement was upheld in Dickerson v. United States, but its prophylactic 
nature was severely narrowed and the warning requirement was constitutionalized. 530 
U.S. 428 (2000). For a new governance perspective on prophylactic rules, see Dorf & 
Sabel, supra note 7, at 452–59. 
 156. In Dickerson, arguments about costs and workability for law enforcement 
personnel were made successfully in support of upholding the Miranda warning 
requirements, notwithstanding the ―undeniabl[e] instances in which the exclusionary rule 
of Miranda imposes costs on the truth-seeking function of a trial, by depriving the trier of 
fact of ‗what concededly is relevant evidence.‘‖ Brief for the United States, at I, 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/osg/briefs/1999/0responses/99-5525.resp.html; Dickerson, 530 
U.S. at 442. 
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conditions of underlying factual uncertainty, rigid rules cannot resolve 
that uncertainty. They will paper over uncertainty, forcing difficult 
interpretations underground—or alternatively forcing rule revisions 
through legislative processes that are far too cumbersome to be 
serviceable in ―live,‖ fast-moving systems. New governance style 
regulation is a more promising long term response to extreme complexity 
and consequent uncertainty, because it is about designing problem-
solving architecture that can respond directly to situations where neither 
the precise goal nor the means for achieving it can be determined in 
advance. This is the kind of environment in which it makes sense to 
enlist the context-specific knowledge of a broad band of stakeholders in 
a collective, comparative, learning-by-doing regulatory project, while not 
being naïve about the impact of self-interest and power. 
IV. PUTTING PEOPLE AT THE CENTER OF REGULATORY DESIGN 
In a recent work, ―Optimization and its Discontents,‖ Bill Simon 
discussed the connection between new governance thought and recent 
failures in banking regulation.
157
 As this Article also tries to point out, 
both are, inter alia, systems that draw on local level knowledge and 
implementation, aggregate it through a regulator, and operate from best 
practices in industry rather than through command-and-control 
regulation. In his paper, Simon draws a useful distinction between what 
he calls the ―vulgar optimization‖ underpinning the failure of Basel II 
initiatives, and ―designing for reliability‖ as new governance is meant to 
do.
158
 Ultimately, Simon argues that Basel II, if it can indeed be seen as 
having failed—something he does not automatically concede159—failed 
as a result of unenlightened implementation. 
Simon describes vulgar optimization on the part of industry actors 
as being marked by reductionist analytical methods around risk that 
missed weak signals, normalized the unexpected, and were not structured 
to systematically learn from experience.
160
 In the run-up to the GFC, 
vulgar optimization caused financial regulators to miss the dynamic, self-
reinforcing nature of ―systemic risk‖ in a deregulatory environment, 
especially ―liquidity risk,‖ ―network externalities‖, and the effect of 
 
 157. William H. Simon, Optimization and its Discontents in Regulatory Design: 
Bank Regulation as an Example 3 (Columbia Pub. Law, Research Paper No. 10-224, 
2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1533446 (noting that ―some of the most 
prominent pre-crisis regulatory initiatives, especially those associated with ‗Basel II‘ . . . 
have a strong ‗new governance‘ and reliability flavor‖). 
 158. See generally id. 
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procyclical regulatory requirements.
161
 It also caused them to 
mischaracterize Knightian uncertainty (the ―unknown unknowns‖) for 
Knightian risk (the quantifiable ―known unknowns‖).162 
Simon contrasts this approach with one based on ―designing for 
reliability,‖ as new governance does.163 Designing for reliability folds in 
prior experience with near misses, and employs root cause analysis and 
deliberative processes to solve problems. Simon argues that what we are 
seeing, in post-GFC reform proposals, is a turn to a more ―dynamic 
perspective‖ that is more consistent with a real new governance 
approach.
164
 For example, regulators are proposing mechanisms designed 
to ensure continuous self-assessment, as with iterative, multi-round stress 
tests; continuously shifting countercyclical capital reserve requirements; 
and continuous validation of risk assessment models. Embedded into the 
validation process is an appreciation of the importance of ―complex 
judgment,‖ meaning professional human due diligence and not just risk 
modeling; a more nuanced understanding of risk; more collaborative or 
deliberative decision-making around a broader set of regulatory norms; 
and more emphasis on and careful implementation of diagnostic and 
comparative analysis (such as outlier analysis and benchmarking).
165
 
All of this seems correct. Simon‘s analysis illustrates the sweeping 
cognitive and methodological failures that underlay the failed 
implementation of decentralized initiatives like Basel II and the CSE 
Program. We should note, however, the reassertion of the need to design 
methods for better rational analysis and deliberation, as a response to 
reductionism and vulgar optimization. While I share these convictions 
and cannot propose a better system than a new governance one based on 
learning-by-doing, transparency, and the examination of root causes, 
what recent experience in the financial markets teaches us is that we 
should not underestimate the agency and energy required to make new 
governance happen. Recognizing the large risks inherent in trying to 
paint with a brush as broad as this one, I nevertheless draw three lessons 
from recent experience in financial regulation. 
First, new governance methods may simply not be feasible in some 
contexts. In retrospect, the amount of energy required to move people off 
their short term incentives turns out to be substantially more than was put 
into the monitorship or CSE Program initiatives. In fact, it may even be 
more than is politically palatable in some situations. It may not be 
possible in all environments, given existing incentives and available 
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resources, to create and maintain meaningful and not just cosmetic new 
governance initiatives. In other words, we need to consider that new 
governance will not work everywhere. Where no one who is in a position 
to influence the situation is prepared to build in accountability and 
capacity, there will not be any, and that may happen unpleasantly often. 
Second, the development of active contestation and deliberation 
within new governance structures cannot be presumed. It must be 
fostered, ensured, and protected. Reason-giving, problem identification, 
and careful problem-solving techniques tend to collapse when everyone‘s 
interests are aligned—during bubble times, for example, but also where 
players‘ pre-existing incentives (combined with insufficient attention to 
real destabilization) mean that cosmetic compliance is probably what 
those players are ultimately prepared to settle for. One response to this is 
to build in real diversity and internal contestation, and to take silence not 
as consent but as an alarm bell. It may require much more serious 
attention to ensuring that a full range of perspectives, including 
perspectives unpopular with traditional ―insiders,‖ are at the table. 
Greater diversity in perspectives should perhaps have been 
introduced in the monitorship situation, but the point is broader than that. 
Understanding how to structure in active contestation and deliberation 
may ultimately call for a richer description of the relationships between 
capital markets actors and the other crucial social, institutional, and 
historical milieus in which they are embedded—to understand which 
actors might ―keep their heads‖ and how to ensure their participation to 
that end. In multiple and intricately connected ways, firm and industry 
and broader culture can affect the degree to which parties are capable of 
acting independently in the face of competitive pressures and behavioral 
cascades. Goldman Sachs famously managed to avoid some of the worst 
excesses in mortgage-backed securities, arguably as a result of its culture 
of ―contrary thinking‖ relative to the rest of its industry.166 Internal 
diversity may also influence a firm‘s stance toward risk-taking, as 
Michael Lewis‘s analysis of Icelandic banks and culture,167 and studies 
of the influence of gender in the financial services industry,
168
 suggest. 
Enforced self-regulation also stands the best chance of success when 
industry actors genuinely care about their broader reputations, something 
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that requires commitments and allegiances beyond one‘s own firm and 
industry.
169
 
All of this should lead us to wonder whether institutions that draw 
on a broader range of perspectives may be better able to maintain some 
cognitive distance from group pathologies, to their own advantage and to 
the advantage of a new governance regulatory approach. This suggests 
that conscious thought needs to be given to how the various pieces of a 
new governance regulatory approach will function together—where each 
actor‘s strengths and vulnerabilities lie, who is and is not participating in 
the interpretive community, and what is required to build checks and 
balances into the system‘s functioning.170 The ultimate question has to be 
who in that environment seems to have sufficient confidence and 
independence of mind (however obtained) to operate independently, how 
to maintain that independence, and how to actively keep the process 
destabilizing and challenging. 
Third, uncertainty may not be the great friend of new governance. 
Knightian uncertainty is a serious problem for which new governance 
does not necessarily offer a silver bullet, even though it is a promising 
response over the long haul. Knightian uncertainty is a breeding ground 
for pathologies in decision making and human conduct. It can be, but is 
not necessarily, a hoped-for opportunity for out-of-the-box thinking, 
surprising collaborations, and unanticipated progress we might hope for. 
There may be situations in which the disadvantages of fluid processes (in 
terms of increased complexity, decreased transparency and knowability, 
and reduced regulatory capacity to provide meaningful oversight) are 
very significant. We may want to consider the need for clear, 
prophylactic rules around areas where fundamental systemic 
requirements are involved and/or regulatory mechanisms can otherwise 
become unwieldy—not because rigid, command-and-control style rules 
are anything like an ideal solution, but because they may help to at least 
temporarily bracket some areas of uncertainty, and allow bounded human 
regulators to be more strategic about where new governance methods can 
be most effectively implemented. Real life regulatory systems do this all 
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the time, of course, but the time may be ripe for new governance scholars 
as well to incorporate attention to real life constraints into their thinking. 
None of this is out of line with familiar new governance thought, 
but there is a tendency to focus on the success stories as conclusive 
evidence that new governance can be very effective. Where experiments 
fail, the simple answer is that those implementing it did not do it 
correctly. The fact that similar failures occur in a variety of 
environments, and that one could even perhaps attribute those failures to 
predictable shortcomings, should provoke us to build in safeguards for 
those failures—even if we cannot identify safeguards that work ideally 
and integrally with new governance at the theoretical level. In this, we 
should not allow the perfect (in the form of perfectly free, broadly 
participatory, dialogic and reflective problem-solving) to be the enemy of 
the good (in the sense of creating systems with as much of these 
elements as possible, while remaining clear-eyed about human capacity). 
We need to consider the risk that the phenomena described above 
will replicate themselves in the interstices of many new governance 
processes, including those outside financial regulation. A clear view of 
human nature needs to be at the core of the new governance model 
because within fluid space, it will drive process and outcomes. 
Understanding how people and their institutions operate, individually 
and in groups, requires us to build in compensatory responses in 
regulatory design in the same way that we would design for other 
predictable flaws. 
 
